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Abstract 
This research project applies a hybrid energy-economy model to compare the cost-
effectiveness of different climate change mitigation policies for the United States. Five 
policies are compared: (1) a technology regulation phasing out coal and natural gas 
generation, (2) Clean Electricity Standard, (3) Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standard, (4) Vehicles Emissions Standard, (5) economy-wide GHG tax. The cost of 
these policies is estimated using three different methodologies. The first methodology is 
the techno-economic cost (TEC) measure, representing a ‘bottom-up’ or engineering 
costing methodology. The second methodology is the perceived private cost (PPC) 
measure, representing the ‘top-down’ or economist costing methodology. The third 
methodology uses the previous two methods to make a “best estimate” of welfare costs, 
called the expected resource cost. 
Going by the expected resource cost measure, the study finds an economy-wide GHG 
tax is a quarter of the cost of two policy scenarios that implement tradable performance 
standards in the electricity and transportation sectors. For the electricity sector policies, 
the study finds that the clean electricity standard is 50% less costly than a technology 
regulation phasing out conventional coal and natural gas generation.  For the 
transportation policies, the study finds that the Vehicle Emissions Standard is 15% less 
costly than the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard.  
Keywords:  Climate change policy; Energy-economy modeling; United States;  
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1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) has stated that 
warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and is evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow 
and ice and rising global average sea level. The IPPC has concluded with very high 
confidence that increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere 
since 1750 is one of the main causes of the increase in global average temperature, and 
that human activities have been the main source of these increased GHG emissions 
(IPCC, 2007).  An international consensus was established with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change that GHG emissions should be stabilized in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system (UN, 1992).  Despite decades of international negotiations and 
attempts by many national governments to implement climate change policies, GHG 
emissions in most developed countries continue to rise. 
The slow pace of progress is perhaps understandable. The world has never 
before faced a pollution problem of this scale. Global emissions in 2004 were 49 billion 
tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). Every country, every sector, and every person 
contributes to these emissions.  The scale of GHG pollution means the implementation 
of “low cost” solutions is crucial.   
Countries and citizens have a limited tolerance to forego current economic 
prosperity for the benefit of future generations.  For instance, many surveys of the U.S. 
public show about 50% of Americans are reluctant to support climate change policies 
that could increase their costs for energy services or increase unemployment (Nesbit 
and Myers, 2007). Leaders of the U.S. Republican party consistently oppose regulation 
of GHG emissions, referring to these regulations as “job-destroying” (Honig, 2011). 
Others emphasize that many low-cost emission reduction opportunities currently exist, 
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and if the right policies are put in place, technological innovation will bring down the cost 
of reducing the remaining GHG emissions (Stern, 2007; Gore, 2009; Krugman, 2010).  
The tension between economic vitality and reducing pollution pervades every 
environmental policy dialogue, but the scale of GHG emissions makes the tension all the 
more acute to climate change policy. Given the importance of low cost solutions, this 
study investigates cost-effective policy options for the United States, a country that has 
substantial influence on Canada’s climate change policy and on international climate 
change policy.  
A cost-effective policy is one that achieves the policy goal at the lowest cost to 
society. In other words, no other course of action could achieve the goal at a lower cost. 
Unlike a cost-benefit analysis, which calculates both the cost and the benefits of a policy, 
a cost-effectiveness analysis only estimates the cost of implementing the policy, thus 
side-stepping the controversial debates about how to value the highly subjective benefits 
of a policy (Stavins, 2011).  
The valuation of the cost of a policy alone can also be quite controversial, as 
analysts employ different definitions of “cost” and different methodologies, both of which 
lead to widely disparate estimates (Fischer & Morgenstern, 2006; Jaccard, 2005a; 
Jaccard et al. 2003).  Decision-makers and the public are then left either confused as to 
the valid estimate, or are left to cherry pick the estimate that best supports their interests 
and values.  
Murphy & Jaccard (2011) use CIMS, a hybrid energy-economy simulation 
model to explain some of the roots of these disparate cost estimates as the extent of a 
model’s representation of three characteristics:  technological explicitness, behavioural 
realism, and macro-economic feedbacks. CIMS has the ability to apply policy costing 
methodologies that represent different application of these characteristics, and thus 
CIMS can be used to help understand the influence of these characteristics on 
estimation of policy cost.  
This research project applies CIMS to compare the cost-effectiveness of 
different climate change mitigation policies for the United States, including the effects of 
different policy costing methodologies on the outcome. A cost-effectiveness study 
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configures different policy approaches to achieve equivalent greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reductions. By holding GHG emission reductions constant, the cost of policies 
can be compared. The basic structure of this policy analysis is the comparison of sector-
specific policies for the electricity and personal transportation sectors with each other, 
and against an economy-wide GHG emission tax policy.   
The electricity and personal transportation sectors were chosen because these 
sectors are responsible for the greatest proportion of GHG emissions in the United 
States. In 2010, the electricity and personal transportation sectors were responsible for 
34% and 27% of total GHG emissions, respectively (EPA, 2012). Considering these 
sectors together is also advantageous because any policy that induces greater adoption 
of electric vehicles will influence the GHG emissions in the electricity sector.   
For the electricity sector, the policies compared are a technology regulation 
mandating the phase out of conventional coal and natural gas generation, and a clean 
electricity standard (CES) mandating that a certain proportion of total generation must 
emit zero GHG emissions.  For the personal transportation sector, the policies compared 
are (1) a corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard mandating that new cars 
sold in a given year must achieve a fuel efficiency standard on average across a car 
manufacturer’s fleet, and (2) a vehicle emissions standard (VES) mandating that new 
cars must achieve a GHG intensity standard (grams CO2e emitted per kilometer driven) 
on average across a company’s fleet.  The CES, CAFE, and VES policies are all 
modeled to be tradable performance standards.  Tradable performance standards mean 
that if a utility or a car company exceeds the standard, by either producing more zero-
emission electricity or selling more efficient cars, those companies can sell performance 
standards to other companies that have not reached the standard.   
In summary, the main research questions of this study are:  
1. What is the cost-effectiveness of different policy instruments in achieving 
a given GHG emissions reduction target? 
2. How do different policy costing methodologies influence the estimation of 
the total cost of a policy? 
 
   4 
In addition to answering these research questions, a secondary objective of this 
paper is to convey the cost of these different policy approaches in terms comprehensible 
to the public at large. To put costs into context, the estimated cost of achieving GHG 
emission reductions is compared to the amount spent on achieving other social and 
private objectives. 
Chapter 2 provides background on climate change policy instruments and 
discusses the different types of modeling approaches for estimating their cost.  Chapter 
3 describes the methodology used in this study to estimate policy cost, including a 
description of the model, CIMS, and the different measures of policy cost that can be 
generated through CIMS.  Chapter 4 provides details on the calibration of CIMS-US, 
comparing CIMS’ forecast for energy consumption and GHG emissions with the US 
Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook.  Chapter 4 also outlines 
specific modeling assumptions relevant to this study.  Chapter 5 provides the results of 
model simulations for ten different policy scenarios. The costs of these policy scenarios 
are compared using three different types of cost measures.  Chapter 5 concludes with a 
section on “Putting Costs into Context”. Chapter 6 discusses the major findings of this 
research study and recommendations for future studies. 
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2. Background 
The objectives and methods of this research project are informed by two 
distinct, but interrelated, research areas.  The first is the study of public policy, 
specifically the study of different policy instruments for achieving a policy goal and how 
decision-makers choose between these options.  The second is the application of 
energy-economy models to provide information to decision-makers and the public on the 
impacts of different policy instruments.  This section discusses both of these fields as 
they relate to this research project. 
2.1. Public Policy and Climate Change Mitigation 
The study of public policy tries to bring deliberate and objective analysis to the 
understanding and solving of public problems.  This research project has benefited from 
two frameworks employed in public policy analysis (1) decision-making criteria for public 
policy, and (2) the categorization of policy options based on specific attributes, such as 
flexibility in compliance.  Each of these frameworks will be discussed in turn below. 
Decision-Making Criteria 
To aid in choosing between policy instruments, decision-makers and policy 
analysts will often use evaluation criteria.  Common criteria for environmental policies 
include effectiveness, administrative feasibility, political acceptability and cost-
effectiveness (Jaccard, 2005b). While this research project is focused on the criteria of 
cost-effectiveness, the other three criteria have also been influential in the configuration 
of the policies in this study.  For example, the study only evaluates policies that are 
thought to be effective at reducing GHG emissions.  Policy instruments that are known to 
be less effective were not chosen, such as the provision of subsidies for consumers to 
buy more energy efficient devices (Loughran & Kulick, 2004). All of the policies are also 
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known to be administratively feasible as they have all been implemented by democratic 
governments in a comparable form.   
Consideration of the political acceptability of policies and the current political 
context of the United States was a major driver in the configuration of the study. Many 
academic studies have assumed that emission pricing, and more specifically a cap & 
trade program, will be the main instrument of choice to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in the United States, and have thus focused on research questions related to 
the design and implementation of such a system (Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009; Metcalf, 
2009; Paltsev, Reilly, Jacoby, & Morris, 2009; Schakenbach, Vollaro, & Forte, 2009; 
Victor & Cullenward, 2007). For instance, Aldy et al. (2010) states plainly that “debate 
over the choice of instrument for a nationwide carbon control program is no longer about 
the superiority of market-based approaches over traditional forms of regulation (like 
technology mandates) but rather between the two market-based alternatives, emissions 
taxes and cap-and-trade systems”.  
However, passing a climate change cap & trade bill or an equivalent economy-
wide GHG tax in the United States appears to be a virtual political impossibility for the 
time being. Although the Democratic Party is in favour of policies to price GHG 
emissions, the Republican Party has lately turned against these policies.  Given the 
division of powers in the US, the Democratic Party would then have to control the 
Presidency, the House of Representatives and the Senate to pass legislation providing 
an economy-wide mechanism to price GHG emissions.   
This situation was almost present during the 111th congressional session (2008-
2009), and the Obama Administration’s central strategy on climate change was the 
development of cap & trade legislation.  During this congressional session, the 
Democratically controlled House of Representatives passed the cap & trade bill (H.R. 
2454), but the bill could not get through the Senate because the Democratic Party did 
not have a supra-majority, which it needed to break Republican filibusters (Lizza, 2010).  
In the 112th Congress (2011-2012), the Democratic Party is in a substantially weaker 
position since the Republicans now have a majority in the House of Representatives and 
the Democrats have been reduced to 51 senators. The 112th Congress also contains an 
even stronger contingent of Republicans opposed to reducing GHG emissions. Of the 
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100 “freshmen” republicans in the 2011 House of Representatives, 50% deny the 
existence of manmade climate change, and 86% are opposed to any climate change 
legislation that increases government revenue (Keyes, 2010). However, some 
Republican congress representatives and senators are supportive of climate change 
legislation. Thus an opportunity exists for Democrats to negotiate with these Republicans 
to pass legislation.  
Such a negotiation would expend significant political capital, which could 
explain why the Obama administration has decided not to pursue an economy wide 
GHG pricing policy, and is now turning to its executive powers over regulation to reduce 
GHG emissions. The President has the power to unilaterally make regulations to reduce 
GHG emissions through previously passed bills, mainly the Clean Air Act, which gives 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate emissions that 
present a danger to human health and the environment (Bianco & Litz, 2010).   
The extent of this power to regulate is limited by the regulatory tools provided in 
the Clean Air Act, some of which are vague and open to legal interpretation.  A clear 
authority exists to set emission performance standards for technologies, but whether 
these standards could be tradable at a sector level is unclear (Richardson et al., 2010, 
18-20). Joe Aldy, former advisor to President Obama on Energy and Environment, 
recently stated in an interview with Nature that the Clean Air Act is not well designed for 
tackling climate change, and that the best way forward in the face of Republican 
opposition would be to try to pass a new piece of legislation mandating a clean energy 
standard in the electricity sector (Tollefson, 2011). Aldy was quoted earlier as inferring 
emissions pricing policies are the only option, so his revised opinion that a regulatory 
approach may now be preferable is indicative of the changing political conditions.  
Regardless of the legal ambiguity over whether new legislation would be needed or not, 
this study looks at both technology-specific and sector-level tradable performance 
standards as examples of more politically feasible policies. 
Economic theory and economic modeling studies conclude that technology and 
sector-specific regulations will reduce GHG emissions at a higher cost than an economy-
wide pricing mechanism, but by how much?  Are there ways to make regulations more 
flexible and lower the costs? Given the current political context in the United States, 
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these are the questions that this study pursues.  As stated by Goulder & Parry (2008) in 
their analysis of climate change policy options: 
 “no single instrument is clearly superior along all the dimensions relevant 
to policy choice...Significant trade-offs arise in the choice of instrument. In 
particular, assuring a reasonable degree of fairness in the distribution of 
impacts, or ensuring political feasibility, often will require a sacrifice of 
cost-effectiveness.”  
While the focus of this study is on cost-effectiveness, this study does not 
presume that the best policy will be the most cost-effective. Rather, information on cost-
effectiveness will be just one factor among many used to choose between policies. For 
instance, new research from psychologists (Bain et al. 2012) demonstrates how support 
for action on climate change is influenced by personal identity and values. This research 
finds that climate change skeptics are more likely to support action on climate change if 
action is framed in terms of producing greater interpersonal warmth or societal 
development rather than a frame focusing on the reality and risks of climate change. 
This finding suggests that regulations emphasizing technological progress to achieve 
cleaner electricity or higher efficiency cars could have a political edge above pricing 
policies focused purely on reducing emissions. Indeed, a recent poll of US public opinion 
on climate policy options found that Americans tend to be opposed to the emissions 
pricing policies most commonly endorsed by economists. Instead, Americans tend to be 
more supportive of regulatory programs related to energy development, industrial 
emission controls, and vehicle fuel efficiency (Borick and Rabe, 2012).  These studies 
show how the economic cost of a policy may be less important than other personal 
values in determining one’s support for a policy. 
Categorization of Policy Options  
Policies can be categorized according to the flexibility of their compliance 
mechanisms and their coverage of emission sources. For this study, flexibility in 
compliance refers to the number of abatement mechanisms an agent can use to achieve 
the regulatory standard.  The full spectrum of GHG abatement mechanisms available to 
society at large includes: 
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 Fuel Switching from fossi fuels to zero-emission fuels (renewables, 
nuclear) 
 Energy Efficiency 
 Carbon Capture and Storage 
 Reducing demand for GHG-intensive goods and services 
 Reduction in deforestation or other harmful land-use change activities 
Thus emission reduction policies that can be met only through improving energy 
efficiency will be less flexible than policies that can be achieved through multiple ways 
such as fuel switching and energy efficiency.  A policy’s coverage of emission sources 
specifies if the policy is technology-specific, sector-specific or economy-wide. Flexibility 
and coverage are related to cost-effectiveness because the economic principle of 
equimarginality states that minimizing the cost of reducing a given amount of pollution 
requires equating marginal abatement costs across all options and agents for reducing 
pollution (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Thus the more emissions a policy covers and the 
more abatement options a policy allows for compliance, the more cost-effective a policy 
is expected to be. 
To illustrate these attributes, Figure 1 depicts policies at different levels of 
flexibility and coverage. Along the X axis, policies are categorized according to their 
coverage of emission sources: technology specific, sector-specific or economy-wide.  
Along the Y axis, policies are categorized according to the number of ways they can 
induce emission reductions: including energy efficiency, fuel switching, carbon capture 
and storage, and reduction in demand for GHG-intensive goods and services. 
Deforestation was not included as an abatement option for this figure because it has 
traditionally been handled through policies specifically designed for its unique 
challenges.  Note that Figure 1 is a simplified characterization of policy instruments to 
highlight the differences between the policies analyzed in this study.  Standards and 
GHG pricing policies can be applied with more variability in their coverage than is 
depicted in this figure. For example, GHG pricing can be applied at the economy-wide 
level, or be limited to certain sectors.  
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Figure 1 Flexibility and Coverage of GHG Abatement Policy Options 
 
Policies that fall in the lower left hand corner are expected to be the least cost-
effective because they are the least flexible and have the least amount of emissions 
coverage. Policies in the top right corner are expected to be the most cost-effective. 
These policies are discussed below in order of their emissions coverage, beginning with 
technology-specific policies. 
The conventional approach to mandating pollution reduction is through 
command and control policies, which force firms to take on similar shares of the 
pollution-control burden, regardless of the cost, by setting uniform performance 
standards at the technology or firm level. Technology performance standards require the 
installation of technologies that fall under a maximum amount of emissions or energy 
consumption per unit of output from the technology. As depicted in Figure 1, the 
technology standard provides the least amount of emissions coverage, covering just the 
emissions from that technology.  
Performance standards at the firm level provide a bit more coverage by setting 
a standard for a level of pollution or energy consumption per unit output of a firm. Firms 
use numerous technologies, materials and processes to produce their output, thus these 
firms will have a multitude of options along their production chain to achieve a standard.  
0
1
2
3
4
Flexibility:
# of Abatement
Options
High Emissions Coverage
Technology     Firm        %Sector         Sector-wide        Economy-wide
Energy Ef f iciency 
Standards
Emissions Intensity
Standards
CAFE
CES
GHG Pricing 
VES
RPS
   11 
When setting these standards, governments typically use the best performing 
technology or firm currently in operation in the market place as a standard, and then 
require all other technologies or firms to meet this standard.  Technology and firm 
standards can inhibit technological innovation as firms typically have no incentive to beat 
the standard (Millliman & Prince, 1989). For instance, if the government sees a firm 
deploying an innovative technology, the government may force that company to 
implement that technology in all operations. 
Technology- and firm based standards can be set up as either energy efficiency 
standards or emissions intensity standards.  Both have the potential to reduce overall 
greenhouse gas emissions, but at differing levels of compliance flexibility. Consider the 
differences in abatement opportunities for each of these standards in the case of a coal 
generation plant.  While the only way for a coal plant to meet an energy efficiency 
standard is to reduce their consumption of coal per kilowatt hour of electricity, a coal 
plant could meet an emissions intensity standard in multiple ways. In addition to 
improving their energy efficiency, the coal plant could pursue fuel switching to retrofit 
their boilers to consume biomass, or the coal plant could retrofit their plant to enable 
carbon capture and storage.  Since each coal plant will have their own unique set of 
circumstances, the presence of options for meeting a standard allows the coal plant to 
pursue the least costly option.   
In addition, these two types of standards have different effects on the supply 
and demand of GHG-intensive goods. By increasing energy efficiency, an energy 
efficiency standard will often lower the cost of consuming a good or service, and will thus 
encourage an increase in its supply and demand, a dynamic termed the “rebound 
effect”.  An emissions intensity standard side-steps the complication of rebound effect by 
directly targeting the problem: emissions.  Targeting emissions will lower demand for 
GHG-intensive goods and services by increasing their cost relative to lower GHG-
intensive goods and services. Thus while energy efficiency standards are quite limited in 
having only energy efficiency as an abatement option and are subject to this negative 
rebound effect, emissions intensity standards allow all four of the abatement options. 
Returning to the issue of emissions coverage, performance standards for firms 
mandate compliance of all firms to a uniform standard, and thus cost-effectiveness is 
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undermined to the extent that firms face different costs for compliance.   Across firms, 
costs can vary enormously due to production design, physical configuration, and age of 
assets. Mandating all firms to achieve the same target will result in higher than 
necessary abatement costs across the whole sector (Stavins, 2011). 
To summarize, the drawbacks of technology- and firm-specific standards are 
twofold:  they impose the highest costs for achieving a given amount of pollution 
reduction and they inhibit technological innovation (Aldy & Stavins, 2011).  However, 
since these standards have been the conventional approach of governments, they tend 
to be the most politically feasible. Governments have a demonstrated legal authority to 
impose these standards, and since they are usually imposed on businesses, they go 
under the radar of the voting public. 
Tradable performance standards lower costs and encourage innovation. These 
standards are met on average across a sector, allowing individual firms the flexibility to 
not meet the standard and buy credits from firms who have exceeded the standard.  
Figure 1 shows four types of tradable performance standards: renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS), clean electricity standard (CES), corporate average fuel economy 
(CAFE) standard, and a vehicle emissions standard (VES).  Similar to the technology 
and firm examples, the policies that are formed as emission standards enable greater 
abatement options than focusing a standard on an attribute related to emissions such as 
fuel type or energy efficiency.  For example, a corporate average fuel economy standard 
will result in emission reductions only through the improvement of energy efficiency, 
while a vehicle emissions standard can be met through improving energy efficiency, 
selling more zero-emission cars (electric and biofuel), or even through improving vehicle 
air conditioning systems.   
A renewable portfolio standard mandates that a certain percentage of a utility’s 
generation be from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and 
biomass.  While a technology-specific policy would mandate or encourage the use of 
one of these renewable electricity technologies over the others, an RPS allows a utility to 
choose the renewable technology that is best for its situation, and also allows the utility 
to buy renewable generating credits from another firm that has exceeded the standard.  
As a policy to achieve emission reductions however, the RPS excludes several 
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abatement options. Firstly, the RPS only covers a portion of total generation, thus the 
other portion could still have very high emissions intensity with no requirement to reduce 
emissions through methods such as fuel efficiency. Secondly, the RPS does not include 
other near zero-emission generation technologies such as nuclear power and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS).  The clean electricity standard differs from the RPS by 
allowing the use of nuclear and CCS power to count towards the required percentage of 
total generation. Thus while the RPS relies on fuel switching from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy, the clean electricity standard allows for fuel switching to renewable 
and nuclear energy, as well as allowing fossil fuel generation with CCS. 
Comparing the cost of sector-wide and technology-specific policies based 
purely on their flexibility and coverage is only appropriate within sectors and not across 
sectors.  For example, Aldy et al. (2010) conclude that achieving emission reductions in 
the personal transportation sector has higher marginal costs than the electricity sector, 
meaning for any given percentage target of emission reduction, the electricity sector 
could reach the target at a lower cost than the personal transportation sector.  Thus a 
technology regulation on coal plants could be less costly than a vehicle emissions 
standard, even though a VES has wider coverage and similar level of abatement 
options. 
Another consideration with sector-specific policies is their effects on emissions 
in other sectors. For example, both a CAFE standard and a VES standard are likely to 
lead to increased electricity demand since electric vehicles are both higher in efficiency 
and lower in emissions than the combustion engine. Consequently, in the absence of 
GHG reduction policies in the electricity sector, these transportation policies could lead 
to increased total emissions.  In the most extreme case, the increased electricity demand 
from the transportation policy could be met with new coal-fired generation.   
The only ways to reduce these inter-sector effects is either through 
implementing policies in each sector simultaneously or through implementing an 
economy-wide policy pricing GHG emissions.  According to the economic principle of 
equimarginality, the most cost-effective policy puts a price on emissions across the 
whole economy, so that every actor faces an equivalent price for emitting (Baumol and 
Oates, 1971).  GHG emission pricing can be achieved through either taxing GHG 
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emissions or establishing a GHG emissions cap & trade system. These policies can be 
applied across multiple sectors or to all emissions in an economy, offering the greatest 
emissions coverage.  They also take advantage of all abatement options, providing the 
greatest flexibility.  
The economist rationale behind taxing pollution is based on classifying pollution 
as a negative externality, meaning an unintentional consequence of production or 
consumption that reduces another agent’s utility.  Polluters benefit from having free 
access to dump their waste products into a common “sink”, but everyone in society 
incurs a cost from the harm caused by this pollution. Pigou (1920) was the first to 
suggest that these externalized costs to society be internalized on the polluter through 
imposing a pollution tax.  Such a system means firms have an incentive to reduce 
emissions to the point where their marginal abatements costs are equal to the tax rate.  
They also have a further incentive to innovate and reduce the residual emissions that 
are being taxed. Such a tax is administratively easy to implement for fossil fuels because 
when burned, each type of fossil fuel releases a standard amount of CO2 emissions. 
Instead of classifying pollution as a negative externality that needs to be taxed, 
pollution can also be thought of as resulting from poorly defined property rights. For 
example, no one owns the atmosphere; it is an open access common resource and is 
thus vulnerable to being taken advantage of by polluters. Access to a common resource 
can be restricted by a government through assigning property rights for emitting pollution 
and allowing these rights to be traded in a market, a mechanism called cap-and-trade. 
This mechanism sets a cap for allowable emissions of a pollutant and then distributes 
emissions permits in line with this cap. The government can either distribute these 
permits through auctioning, allocating them freely to firms, or a combination of both. 
Regulated firms must surrender permits equal in value to the emissions for which their 
activities are responsible. The permits may be bought and sold, allowing firms with high 
abatement costs to purchase permits from firms with low abatement costs. The trading 
market for permits then reveals the effective marginal price for emitting (Metcalf, 2009; 
Stavins, 2011).   
A large literature exists comparing the pros and cons of an emissions tax 
against a cap-and-trade system, but largely these differences relate to the political 
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acceptability and administrative feasibility of one instrument over the other (Stavins, 
2011). In terms of cost-effectiveness, a cap-and-trade system with auctioned permits is 
expected to result in virtually the same abatement cost as a GHG tax with the same 
emissions coverage. The revenue from a GHG tax or auctioned permits can be recycled 
back into the economy through lowering personal income or corporate taxes, or by 
investing it in public infrastructure and services.  
A cap-and-trade with freely allocated permits will be less cost-effective than an 
emissions tax or a cap & trade with auctioned permits. Since permits have a value in the 
permit market, freely allocating these permits to polluters is equivalent to giving a 
subsidy to a polluting industry, lowering that industry’s production costs and making it 
profitable to increase production. But a cap-and-trade with freely allocated permits will 
still be more cost-effective than a non-pricing policy. 
This section has provided a brief introduction to the spectrum of policy options 
for reducing GHG emissions.  Virtually every country in the developed world has chosen 
some combination of policies to reduce GHG emissions. Each country’s choice is 
influenced by their particular political and economic circumstances, which subsequently 
determines how each policy fares when evaluated under the criteria of political and 
administrative feasibility.  Generally speaking, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
of policy instruments are similar across countries. The following section discusses how 
these different types of abatement policies are being implemented or considered in the 
United States. 
2.2. Current Policies of US Federal Government 
In the 2007 Supreme Court Case Massachusettes vs. EPA, the court ruled that 
GHG emissions are considered air pollutants under the existing Clean Air Act and 
therefore must be regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) if they 
endanger human health and welfare. In December of 2009, the EPA issued their final 
finding that GHG emissions threaten the public health and welfare of American people, 
and that GHG emissions from on-road vehicles contribute to this threat. This finding was 
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a legal requirement in the Clean Air Act to proceed with implementing GHG standards on 
light-duty vehicles (EPA, 2009). 
In line with the Supreme Court ruling, the Obama Administration committed to 
reduce GHG emissions at the international level through the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. 
The U.S. committed to a greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target of 17% 
below 2005 emission levels by 2020, 42% reduction by 2030, and 83% reduction by 
2050 (Department of State, 2010).  As of June 2012, the Obama administration has 
approved some measures to reduce GHG emissions in the personal transportation 
sector, and policies for the electricity sector are still in development. 
Transportation Sector 
The Obama Administration has been very active in proposing and finalizing fuel 
economy and GHG emission standards for vehicles.  Their approach for these standards 
can be classified as tradable performance standards within the broad vehicle categories 
of light-duty vehicles and heavy-duty vehicles.  Performance standards can not be 
traded between certain vehicle categories, but they can be traded within categories. 
The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) and the EPA 
are working jointly to implement these standards because the NHSTA is the designated 
authority to implement vehicle fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) and the EPA is the designated authority to implement GHG 
emissions standards for vehicles under the Clean Air Act.  EPA has finalized GHG 
emission standards for light-duty vehicles in model years 2012-2025. For model year 
2025, the finalized standard requires, on an average industry fleet wide basis, 163 
grams CO2 /mile, equivalent to 54.5 mpg if all of the CO2 emission reductions were 
achieved with fuel economy technology.  NHTSA still needs to publish finalized 
standards for fuel economy, but their proposal would require, on an average industry 
fleet wide basis, 40.9 mpg in model year 2021, and 49.6 mpg in model year 2025 (EPA 
& NHTSA, 2011a, 7-8).  These agencies explain that the NHTSA fuel economy 
standards are lower than the EPA standards for reasons of harmonization because 
statutory constraints in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act do not allow NHTSA’s 
standards to include air conditioning system refrigerant and leakage improvements. The 
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agencies also state that they believe these standards can be met with improvements in 
conventional gasoline and hybrid vehicle technologies and an increased market share of 
more advanced technologies including electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles. 
The NHTSA states that consumers who buy vehicles that can use 85% ethanol 
in their fuel (E85 fuel) fill their vehicles with E85 fuel a small percentage of the time, thus 
their treatment of E85 vehicles for purposes of complying with the standards will be 
based on real-world usage of E85 fuel (EPA & NHTSA, 2011a, 17). 
The fuel economy and GHG standards for model years 2012-2025 have similar 
flexibility provisions for compliance.  Vehicle manufacturers can earn credits for 
exceeding the standards of a vehicle category (passenger cars and light-duty trucks). 
EPA allows for the unlimited transfer of these credits between the categories of 
passenger cars and trucks, while NHTSA allows for transfer of these credits up to a 
statutory limit.  For both the EPA and NHTSA standards, the credits can be carried 
forward for five years, carried back for three years, or traded with other manufacturers  
(EPA & NHTSA, 2011a, 17-18). 
In August 2011, the Obama Administration finalized fuel efficiency standards for 
heavy-duty engines and vehicles for model years 2014-2018.  Fuel efficiency and GHG 
emission standards have been set for the three major categories of heavy-duty vehicles:  
combination tractors (semi-trucks), heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans, and vocational 
vehicles (such as transit buses and refuse trucks). Companies will have similar 
flexibilities in complying with the standards as manufacturers of light-duty vehicles.  The 
flexibility provisions allow for engine averaging, banking and trading within each of the 
regulatory subcategories, but not across subcategories (NHTSA & EPA, August 2011).   
Electricity Sector 
Once any substance becomes a regulated pollutant under the Clean Air Act, 
new or modified sources of the pollutant become subject to a new source review 
permitting process.  A tailoring rule limits the reach of the new source review permits to 
new stationary sources that would emit at least 100,000 tons per year of CO2e or major 
modifications of existing sources that would emit at least 75,000 tons per year of CO2e. 
The implementation of GHG standards for motor vehicles triggers these new source 
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review requirements for major new sources and major modification of existing stationary 
sources that occur after January 1, 2011 (Pew Center, 2010). 
When the EPA failed to act on these obligations under the Clean Air Act, 
several states, local governments and environmental organizations sued the EPA over 
their failure to update the new source review permits for fossil fuel power plants and 
petroleum refineries, two of the largest source categories of GHG pollution in the United 
States.  The EPA negotiated a settlement agreement with these parties to propose 
standards for power plants in July 2011 and for refineries in December 2011 and will 
issue final standards in May 2012 and November 2012, respectively.   As of July 2012, 
the EPA is behind schedule and has only proposed new source performance standards 
for electricity. Their proposal would limit CO2 emissions from new fossil-fuel fired 
electricity generating units greater than 25 megawatts to 1,000 pounds per megawatt-
hour, a level based on the CO2 emissions from natural gas-fired combined cycle units 
(NGCC) (Gibson, 2012).  
Despite the delay, final performance standards for the electricity and petroleum 
refining industries appear to be imminent.  However, the election of a Republican 
President could through them off track in November 2012. Regardless, for the purposes 
of this study, the key consideration is that the policy instrument the US government is 
pursuing for the electricity sector is a firm-specific performance standard for new power 
plants only, one of the least cost-effective of the instruments reviewed in Section 2.1. 
2.3. Rationale for Policy Choice in this Study 
The most politically feasible option for the US government to mandate GHG 
emission reductions in the electricity sector is firm-specific emissions standards. Indeed, 
this seems to be the route that the current US government is taking. To investigate the 
cost-effectiveness of this approach, this study compares a firm-specific performance 
standard for the electricity sector with a tradable performance standard. The firm-specific 
policy prohibits installation of new coal-fired generation from 2016-2050 and natural gas 
generation from 2031-2050, unless these plants utilize carbon capture and storage 
technology that capture 90% of their GHG emissions. This emissions standard for firms 
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is compared to a tradable performance standard, specifically a clean electricity standard 
(CES), which mandates that a certain percentage of generation within the electricity 
sector be from zero-emission sources. A CES is chosen over a renewable portfolio 
standard (RPS) because, for all of the reasons discussed in Section 2.1, a CES is likely 
more cost-effective than an RPS. 
For transportation, I chose to compare the cost of two types of tradable 
performance standards – corporate average fuel efficiency standard and a vehicle 
emissions standard. I am only comparing tradable performance standards for this sector 
because these are the types of policies currently being implemented by the US federal 
government, thus they are unlikely to consider technology or firm specific policies in the 
future for this sector.  The US federal government is currently implementing both a CAFE 
standard and a vehicle emissions standard, which is a questionable approach from the 
perspective of GHG emission reduction since only one of these policies is necessary to 
achieve this goal.  Of course, the foremost stated goal of the CAFE standard is to reduce 
dependence on foreign oil, but a vehicle emissions standard would also reduce oil 
consumption and should theoretically be more cost-effective at reducing emissions than 
a CAFE standard.  Thus arguably the US should only implement one of these tradable 
performance standards, and should choose the standard that reduces oil consumption 
and GHG emissions in the most cost-effective manner. 
To facilitate the evaluation of the cost of these firm- and sector- specific 
abatement policies, I found an economy-wide GHG tax that is estimated by the model to 
reach equivalent levels of GHG emission reductions.  The revenue from the GHG tax is 
then returned to each sector in proportion to how much each sector contributes, and 
firms within a sector receive their share of the recycled revenue according to an 
unbiased formula, such as a firm’s output. This GHG tax schedule can be considered 
equivalent to a cap-and-trade policy whereby emissions are capped at the same level as 
the emission reductions from a firm- or sector-specific policy and permits are distributed 
through an auction. A GHG tax and an auctioned cap & trade are just two different paths 
to the same destination. When emission reductions under a GHG tax or under a cap-
and-trade are equivalent, then the effective price on emitting is also equal.  Furthermore, 
when the price of emitting and emission reductions are equivalent, as then can be under 
a GHG tax or cap-and-trade, then the total cost of a policy is also equal (Metcalf, 2009; 
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Weitzman, 1974).  Thus for the purposes of a cost-effectiveness study, these policies 
can be considered interchangeable. 
The total cost of implementing these firm, sector, and economy-wide policies 
can be estimated through energy-economy models. The next section provides 
background on the different types of energy-economy models and how they can be used 
to simulate the implementation of policies in an economy. 
2.4. Energy-Economy Models for Environmental Policy 
Analysis 
Energy-economy models can be used to estimate the environmental and 
economic impact of policies that affect energy consumption and production. This study 
uses a hybrid energy-economy model to simulate policies to induce GHG emission 
reductions.  The term “hybrid” originates because the model draws from two other 
categories of models: (1) bottom-up technology models, and (2) top-down models. Each 
of these categories of models has strengths and weaknesses in estimating and 
describing the impacts of environmental policy. In many cases, the strength of a bottom-
up model is a weakness of a top-down model, which is why hybrid models developed to 
take advantage of the strengths of both bottom-up and top-down models (Jaccard, 
2009). The common link between bottom-up, top-down and hybrid models used to 
analyze climate change mitigation is that they all model interactions between energy, the 
environment and the economy. They differ with respect to the following key attributes: (1) 
technological explicitness (2) behavioural realism, (3) macro-economic feedbacks.  
Conventional bottom-up models include a broad set of technologies that can be 
substituted for one another to meet energy service demands. Most of these models are 
optimization models that choose a technology mix to optimize a certain goal, such as 
reducing emissions at the lowest financial cost, subject to certain constraints, such as 
emission levels (Loschel, 2002). The strength of bottom-up models lies in their 
technological richness, allowing for new technologies and technological innovation to be 
directly considered. Their high level of technological detail also allows for a better 
“picture” of how the future may evolve under various policy regimes. 
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While these models have the advantage of being technologically detailed, they 
lack behavioural realism, which refers to a model’s ability to represent the behaviour of 
firms and consumers. Conventional bottom-up models treat technologies that deliver a 
similar service as perfect substitutes and compare substitutable technology only on their 
direct financial costs and emissions. In reality, one technology is often not a perfect 
substitute for another technology, and firms and consumers consider much more than 
just financial cost when making technology choices. These other costs, described in 
further detail in Section 3.2, include intangible costs such as risk of technology failure, 
and consumer values such as convenience, aesthetics, and reliability.   
Top-down models are a mirror image of bottom-up models. They lack 
technological detail but they are better at incorporating behavioural realism. Top-down 
models estimate aggregate relationships between energy and other inputs into the 
economy based on their relative costs and the degree of substitutability between inputs 
to produce economic output. Elasticity of substitution (ESUB) parameters are used in 
top-down models to describe how factors of production are substituted for one another 
when their relative prices change.  The degree to which a policy results in a shift away 
from carbon emitting inputs depends on the elasticity of substitution between alternative 
inputs, or in other words, the ease at which low-to zero emitting inputs can be substituted 
for high emitting inputs (Ramskov & Munksgaard, 2001).  
In addition to being more behaviourally realistic, top-down models often 
incorporate macroeconomic feedbacks, a feature that conventional bottom-up models do 
not include.  For instance, an increasingly popular type of top-down model, the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, will balance the supply and demand of 
goods when changes occur in the price of factors of production such as capital, labour 
and energy. Conventional CGE models assume that the economy is in equilibrium in the 
model’s base year and in the business as usual (BAU) projections from the base year.  
When a policy is then simulated in the model that affects the relative prices of factors of 
production, the modeled economy is put into dis-equilibrium. The model then calculates 
a new equilibrium point by finding a new set of prices based on elasticity of substitution 
parameters, and a new level of consumption and production based on supply and 
demand functions (Bergman and Henrekson, 2003). 
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The differences between bottom-up and top-down models are significant 
because they often come to vastly different conclusions about the cost of greenhouse 
gas abatement. Bottom-up technology models often conclude that substantial GHG 
emission reductions are possible at little or no extra cost compared to a business as 
usual scenario (McKinsey&Company, 2009).  In contrast, since conventional top-down 
models assume the economy is in equilibrium in the business as usual scenario, any 
policy that moves the economy away from equilibrium imposes a cost to society.  
Hybrid models take the design strengths of both bottom-up and top-down 
models to make a model that integrates technological explicitness, behavioural realism 
and macro-economic feedbacks.  This study uses a hybrid energy-economy simulation 
model, CIMS, which originated as a bottom-up technology model and then was modified 
to include design features of top-down models.  
Murphy & Jaccard (2011) explore the differences between the McKinsey 
bottom-up model and a hybrid model, CIMS.  When CIMS is run with its normal settings, 
it produces a higher abatement cost curve than McKinsey. As well, McKinsey finds the 
majority of emission reductions are a result of increasing energy efficiency, while CIMS 
finds emission reductions come from a mixture of fuel switching and energy efficiency. 
Through turning off the macroeconomic feedbacks and behavioural realism within CIMS, 
Murphy & Jaccard (2011) were able to reproduce an abatement cost curve similar to 
McKinsey’s model, demonstrating the reasons why these models produce different 
results. 
Through focusing just on financial technology costs, the McKinsey model 
generates optimism for the potential of energy efficiency in reducing emissions. But this 
optimism may be misplaced because the model does not actually represent how firms 
and consumers make their decisions, and the model doesn’t include macro-economic 
linkages (Murphy & Jaccard, 2011).  Politicians are tempted by the conclusions of 
bottom-up models like McKinsey, seeing an opportunity to generate economic savings 
and reduce emissions through increasing energy efficiency. However, policies that place 
too much emphasis on energy efficiency will not actually produce the promised emission 
reductions because this promise is based on conclusions from the flawed methodology 
of bottom-up models. This example of McKinsey vs. CIMS demonstrates the importance 
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of incorporating behaviour and macro-economic feedbacks, and also more generally, 
shows the importance of critically evaluating energy modeling methodology. 
Variation across Energy-Economy Models 
To be clear, the difference in the structure between bottom-up, top-down, and 
hybrid models is not the only factor causing divergent cost estimates.  Substantial 
variation in cost estimates exists within each category of model type as well.  The only 
way to determine why models get disparate results is to compare results from different 
models that are operating under a similar set of assumptions. The Energy Modeling 
Forum (EMF) run out of Stanford University is a leading institution that organizes these 
types of cross-model comparisons.  One such comparison is EMF-16, which completed 
its study in 1999 on estimating the costs of the US to reach their Kyoto commitments 
with various levels of international trading. This comparison, containing mostly top-down 
models, had cost estimates that varied by a factor of five or more (Weyant, 2008).  
Fischer & Morgenstern (2006) examined the variation in abatement cost curves 
for models participating in EMF-16, which included mostly CGE models and a few 
hybrids. In this study, econometric analysis was used to measure the influence of certain 
model characteristics on a model’s estimation of abatement cost. Fischer & Morgenstern 
(2006) found the following model characteristics to be significant in explaining variation 
in abatement costs across models: (1) the presence of a backstop technology, (2) the 
number of regions and number of sectors, and (3) the framework for modeling 
international linkages, such as perfect mobility versus Armington assumptions. While 
these findings indicated areas for further research, they could not draw conclusions on 
which model configuration is more “correct” in estimating abatement costs. The authors 
concluding statement is illustrative of the state of current knowledge with respect to 
explaining the variation amongst models: 
Collectively, large and small modeling choices form a black box that 
calculates abatement costs. The same black box calculates baseline 
emissions and thereby abatement requirements, making cross-model 
comparisons more difficult. In principle, one can open the box and seek 
detailed information across models about key modeling and 
parameterization choices...Arguably, our ability to interpret the effects of 
broader structural choices in climate models is hampered by the lack of 
specific information about such choices (Fischer & Morgenstern 2006). 
   24 
CIMS enables some light to enter the “black box” of abatement costs because 
its flexible hybrid structure allows the calculation of abatement costs with a bottom-up 
methodology or a top-down methodology. Although CIMS does not have the full general 
equilibrium capabilities of most top-down models since it only balances energy supply 
and demand markets. The technological detail within CIMS also allows for more 
comprehensive explanations of modeling results than can be achieve with top-down 
models. The following sections describe CIMS and the methodology employed in this 
study to calculate abatement costs using CIMS results. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodological component of this study can be broken into two parts. 
Firstly, climate change policies are simulated using CIMS, a hybrid energy-economy 
model developed in the Energy and Materials Research Group (EMRG) at Simon Fraser 
University.  Secondly, the total cost of each climate change policy is calculated from 
results of CIMS’ simulations. Section 3.1 gives a general overview of CIMS, including a 
description of the following key attributes in the model: (1) technological choice and 
innovation, (2) behavioural realism, (3) macro-economic feedbacks. Section 3.2 
describes the three measures by which total abatement costs are calculated with CIMS 
results. 
3.1. Hybrid Energy-Economy Model: CIMS 
Characteristic of bottom-up models, CIMS has a detailed representation of 
energy service demands in an economy (such as heated commercial floor space or 
person-kilometres-travelled). CIMS then has a detailed representation of the energy 
technologies that can be used to meet these services. For each service, technologies 
with variable characteristics compete to meet demand (Rivers and Jaccard, 2006). 
A CIMS simulation begins in 2000 and runs in five-year periods until 2050.  In 
each period, the model follows these five steps in sequence (Bataille, 2005) : 
1. Assessment of Demand: Demand for services from each sector is 
determined through modifying an exogenous forecast with information 
from the macro module if the price of the service has changed. 
2. Retirement and Retrofit: Technology stock from the previous period is 
selected for retirement according to an age-dependent function. 
These technologies can either be fully retired or retrofitted.  The 
difference between the residual capacity and the demand for service 
is the level of new technology stock that needs to be acquired. 
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3. Competition for New Stock: At each service node, technologies 
compete for new market share based on a market share algorithm 
(explained below). 
4. Equilibrium of Supply and Demand: Once forecasted demand has been 
satisfied, the model iterates between the energy supply and demand 
modules until equilibrium prices for energy are found. 
5. Output: The model generates values for energy consumption, GHG 
emissions, economic factor costs, and service output. The scale of 
this output ranges from economy and sector-wide to technology-
specific.  
The market share algorithm is the core function in CIMS that determines which 
technologies gain market share for delivery of a service. The function, as seen in 
Equation 1, compares the life-cycle costs (LCC) of one technology to its possible 
substitutes, and applies a variance parameter, v, to represent the heterogeneity in costs 
of technologies in the marketplace. 
Equation 1 
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A high value for v, such as 100, means that the technology with the lowest life-
cycle cost captures almost all of the new equipment stocks.  An extremely low value for 
v, such as 1, means that new equipment market shares are distributed almost evenly 
between all competing technologies, even if their life-cycle costs differ significantly.  
Thus, v represents sensitivity of the technology competition to relative life-cycle costs. 
The default value for v is 10, meaning that where a technology has an LCC advantage of 
at least 15% over its competitor(s) it would capture at least 80% of new stock. 
A technology’s life-cycle costs, calculated through Equation 2, includes financial 
costs (capital, operating, energy, emission), and intangible costs or benefits.  
Equation 2 
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CCj = Capital Cost for technology ‘j’ 
ICj = Intangible Cost for technology ‘j’ 
rj = revealed discount rate for technology ‘j’ 
nj = life of technology for technology ‘j’ 
The intangible cost parameter is one method CIMS employs to represent 
behavioural realism. This parameter represents the fact that a technology may not 
always be a perfect substitute for another technology, even though it delivers an 
equivalent service.  For example, an energy efficient washing machine may have 
cheaper financial costs but it takes double the amount of time to do a wash, thus a 
consumer may perceive this extra time as an additional cost.  Or a firm may perceive a 
new innovation as higher risk due to a lack of production experience. 
Another behavioural parameter in CIMS is revealed discount rates. Bottom-up 
models annualize capital costs using a social discount rate based on the cost of 
borrowing money from a bank, ranging from 5-10%. In CIMS, capital costs and upfront 
intangible costs are annualized by a higher “revealed” discount rate, based on observed 
behaviour of consumers and firms when they make capital investment decisions.  
Over the years, EMRG has made a concerted effort to empirically estimate key 
behavioural parameters using discrete choice models.  The data for these models can 
be acquired from revealed preferences in market transactions or from the stated 
preferences in a discrete choice survey. Studies on revealed discount rates, intangible 
costs, and the v parameter, have been completed for personal transportation (Horne, 
2003; Axsen et al. 2009) , thermal technologies in industry (Rivers & Jaccard, 2005), and 
residential energy choices (Sadler, 2003).  When a specific study has not been 
completed, behavioural parameters are set through literature review or through 
calibrating the model to historical data. See Appendix 1 for the discount rates used in the 
US version of CIMS. 
When simulating the development of energy systems over decades, the 
incorporation of technological innovation becomes a key modeling consideration. In 
CIMS, innovation is represented by declining capital costs of abatement technologies as 
their cumulative production increases over time.  CIMS uses a declining capital cost 
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function to link a technology’s capital cost in future periods to its cumulative production. 
The capital cost of a technology declines according to Equation 3 where C(t) is the 
financial cost of a technology at time t, N(t) is the cumulative production of a technology 
at time t, and PR is the progress ratio, defined as the percentage reduction in cost 
associated with a doubling in cumulative production of a technology. Progress ratios are 
calculated from empirical evidence of the historical relationship between capital cost and 
cumulative production. Typically, progress ratios range from 75 to 95 percent (Jaccard, 
2009).  A progress ratio of 75% means that when a technology’s production doubles, the 
capital cost is expected to be 75% of the original capital cost. 
Equation 3 Declining Capital Costs 
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Early modeling efforts approximated learning curves by decreasing cost only as 
a factor of time. When such models were used to evaluate when GHG abatement 
actions should be taken to reach a target, they recommended delaying abatement 
actions since delayed actions were cheaper. However, for most products and services, 
the passage of time is not what makes them cheaper. Rather, the capital costs of 
technologies decline as their production grows due to experience and economies of 
scale (Loschel, 2002; McDonald & Schrattenholzer, 2001).  
The “neighbour effect” is another dynamic that occurs with increased production 
and consumption of a new technology.  Research shows that as information on a 
technology’s performance becomes more readily available, perceptions of risk are 
lowered. In other words, as your “neighbours” start using a technology, knowledge of 
that technology increases and risks are lowered, thus making it less costly to acquire 
that technology.  To simulate this dynamic, CIMS has a declining intangible cost function 
that links the intangible costs of a technology in a given period with its market share in 
the previous period. Intangible costs are modeled to decline according to Equation 4, 
where i(t) is the intangible cost of a technology at time t, i(fixed) is the portion of initial 
intangible cost that is static, i(0) is the variable portion of intangible cost at time period 0,  
MSt-1 is the market share of the technology at time t-1, and A and k represent the curve 
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and rate of change of the intangible cost in response to increases in the market share of 
the technology (Axsen et al., 2009). 
Equation 4 Declining Intangible Cost 
 ( )   (     )   
 ( )
        (   )
 
Macro-economic feedbacks are another key dynamic process in CIMS.  Macro-
economic feedbacks refer to changes in supply and demand as a result of changes in 
prices. Climate change policies will often increase the cost of meeting a given energy 
service, since more expensive technologies will replace lower cost GHG-intensive 
technologies. Increasing the cost of an energy service then decreases the demand for 
this service. For instance, consider the macro-economic feedbacks involved in a policy 
to phase-out coal generation and increase renewable generation.  In replacing coal 
generation with higher cost renewable generation, the price of electricity increases, 
causing a decrease in demand for electricity.  In addition, the demand for coal would 
also decrease, lowering the output of the coal mining sector. 
Most top-down models used today are general equilibrium models, meaning the 
supply and demand across all sectors of the economy are balanced as prices change. 
CIMS is only a partial equilibrium model, with a focus on balancing supply and demand 
for energy related services.  CIMS does not equilibrate government budgets and the 
markets for employment and investment (Jaccard et al., 2004).  
In summary, CIMS takes advantage of the best attributes of both bottom-up and 
top-down models to estimate the environmental and economic impact of a climate 
change policy.  The following section describes the different ways economic impact can 
be assessed using CIMS results. 
3.2. Measures of Policy Cost 
The “cost” of a pollution abatement policy refers to the cost of inducing or 
forcing consumers and firms to switch away from a technology or behaviour that they 
would otherwise choose.   Bottom-up and top-down models apply different definitions of 
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“cost” and therefore make very different estimates for how much a policy will cost to 
implement.   
G. Box, a simulation modeler, is quoted as saying “while all models are wrong, 
some are more useful”. Jaccard et al. (2003) state that for models to be useful in costing 
GHG reduction, they need to help policy-makers understand the key factors behind 
divergent cost estimates.  CIMS is useful in this respect because it can be used to 
produce cost estimates consistent with the definition of cost employed in a bottom-up or 
a top-down model.  Namely, three cost measures can be produced with results from 
CIMS (1) techno-economic cost (2) perceived private cost, and (3) expected resource 
cost.  
To understand how these measures differ from each other, the concept of “cost” 
must first be broken into smaller components.  Figure 2 depicts the components of costs 
in boxes, and the parameter(s) representing each cost component in CIMS are indicated 
in circles. “Cost” can first be separated into “certain” costs and “intangible” costs.  
“Certain” costs are those that can be estimated before an investment is made 
(ex ante) with a fair degree of certainty through engineering estimates of expected 
capital, operating and energy costs. However, ex ante engineering estimates of financial 
cost have been found to consistently underestimate ex poste financial costs of a 
technology because they only consider those costs that are absolutely certain, and leave 
out costs that have a probability of occurring or are non-monetized.  While engineering 
estimates may often leave out these intangible costs, firms and consumers will regularly 
perceive them as real “costs” (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Consequently, engineering 
estimates will often overestimate the adoption of a new technology because they only 
contain a partial representation of “cost”.  
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Figure 2 Components of Policy “Cost” 
 
CIMS aims to be a behaviourally realistic model and thus uses both certain and 
intangible cost attributes to simulate technology choice. Intangible costs are more 
difficult to quantify because firms and consumers perceive these costs with varying 
magnitudes and probabilities. Within the CIMS framework, intangible costs are divided 
into five categories – (1) market heterogeneity, (2) risk (3) option value (4) consumer/firm 
preference (5) perceived costs from market failures.  
 Market heterogeneity refers to costs that are specific to the individual 
circumstances of firms and consumers, such as installation and operating costs, which 
can vary by location and type of facility or household  (Jaccard, 2005, 95). For example, 
a company considering whether to switch from a technology fueled by oil to one fueled 
by natural gas will face varying levels of cost depending on the surrounding natural gas 
infrastructure.  Likewise, a consumer contemplating geothermal heating for their house 
will face lower costs if their house is built on soil than if it is built on rock.  When 
simulating the technology choice decisions of firms and consumers, CIMS incorporates 
heterogeneous costs by putting a probability distribution around the life-cycle cost of a 
technology, with the engineering estimate as the average cost and the “v” parameter 
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representing the variability of costs.  As discussed in Section 3.1, if market data shows 
high variability in the technology choices for a given energy service, then “v” will be 
small, and vice versa if the market for an energy service is fairly uniform.  
The second category of intangible costs is risk of technology failure or 
malfunction. New technologies usually have a higher chance of premature failure 
because they are not “tried, tested, and true”. Conventional technologies such as the 
combustion engine and steam turbine have been utilized for over a century.  Incremental 
innovations to these technologies have made them dependable and society has 
amassed considerable knowledge on how to run and repair them.  As well, technology 
risk can be higher in new technologies with lower emission or higher energy efficiency 
because these technologies usually have higher upfront capital costs, meaning they will 
have longer payback periods.  Since the cumulative probability of failure or accident or 
undesired economic conditions increases over time, any technology with a longer 
payback period is riskier by nature (Jaccard, 2005b).   The risk of longer payback 
periods is why many firms require a payback period for investments of 2-3 years, 
equivalent to annualizing capital costs with a discount rate of 33-50% (Nyboer, 1997). 
The third category of intangible cost is loss of option value.  Option value is the 
value of delaying an irreversible investment, which gives an investor an opportunity to 
wait for new information about prices, costs, and overall market conditions. The 
conventional rule for when to make an investment is to invest when the net present 
value of a unit of capital is at least as large as its purchase and installation cost. Pindyck 
(1991) explains that this rule does not explain investment behaviour for irreversible and 
avoidable investment decisions.   He modifies the conventional rule to “the value of the 
unit of capital must exceed the purchase and installation cost by an amount equal to the 
value of keeping the investment option alive.” 
Risk and option value overlap to the extent that a firm or consumer will value 
waiting to invest in a new technology until they can receive more information about its 
performance. Because of this overlap and the difficulty in measuring risk and option 
value for individual technologies, these costs are represented by the revealed discount 
rates that research shows firms and consumers use to amortize capital costs in 
particular sectors or for particular energy services.  Revealed discount rates are typically 
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higher than standard financial discount rates.  For example, some firms demand a 2-year 
payback for capital investments and will thus annualize capital costs with a discount rate 
of 50%. Consumers have also been found to have high discount rates for more energy 
efficient technology. Despite the fact that engineering cost estimates suggest consumers 
would save money by adopting these technologies, adoption rates are quite low.   
The fourth component of intangible costs is loss of consumers’ surplus, which is 
the extra value that consumers receive above the financial cost of a particular 
technology. The significance of consumer surplus is that even though one technology 
may have the lowest financial cost for delivering an energy service, another technology 
may provide a larger consumer surplus. All technologies have different attributes and 
associated risks, meaning varying degrees of technology “substitutability” exist for any 
given energy service. For example, while small cars may cost less to operate per 
kilometer, many consumers value sports-utility vehicles and pick-up trucks for their 
comfort, utility, safety, and even cultural status.  Consumers also value the convenience 
of owning a car over public transit, even though transit is a considerably cheaper mode 
of transportation (Jaccard et al., 2004).  
Consumers’ surplus is simulated in CIMS at two levels – the energy service 
level and the technology level.  Energy services refer to the aggregate demand for a 
service such as mobility or square feet of housing. In the CIMS residential and personal 
transportation sectors, the demand for these services changes according to a price 
elasticity parameter, which will decrease demand if the price of consuming the service 
increases. The loss of demand for an energy service represents a consumers’ surplus 
loss. 
 At the technology level, consumers’ surplus is represented in a parameter 
called “intangible costs”, which is used in the calculation of life cycle costs for 
technologies that are known to have considerable non-financial values for firms and 
consumers.  This parameter will raise the costs of less preferred technologies and 
decrease the costs of preferred technologies.  The most rigorous way to determine this 
parameter is through revealed choice data and stated preference choice surveys, as was 
done for personal vehicle choices in Axsen et al. (2009).  In the absence of such studies, 
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CIMS modelers will use this parameter to calibrate observed technology choices as 
shown through market data. 
The last component of intangible costs can actually be thought of as a “false 
cost”, or a portion of the perceived cost that does not actually result in a real cost on the 
firm or consumer. Discussed further in the upcoming section on Expected Resource 
Cost, these false perceived costs occur due to the market failures of lack of information 
and bounded rationality.   
The following sections explain how the different components of cost explained 
above are combined to form CIMS’ three different methods of calculating cost.   The first 
method, techno-economic cost (TEC), can be considered a lower bound estimate of cost 
and is consistent with a definition of cost employed by bottom-up models. The second 
method, the perceived private cost (PPC) is an upper bound estimate of cost, consistent 
with the economic theory employed by top-down models. And lastly, the expected 
resource cost (ERC) is a measure between the TEC and the PPC, which the Energy and 
Materials Research Group thinks most closely estimates the real cost of a policy to 
society. Refer back to Figure 2 (pg. 31) for a depiction of the components of cost 
included in each of these measures. 
Techno-Economic Cost 
The techno-economic cost (TEC) measure represents just the ex ante 
engineering estimates of capital, operating, and energy costs – depicted in the far left 
hand side of Figure 2.  No components of intangible cost are included in the TEC 
measure. Techno-economic cost of a policy is calculated from the output of a CIMS 
simulation by taking the difference in total investment on capital, energy and operating & 
maintenance between the policy scenario and the business as usual scenario.  Equation 
5 shows how TEC is calculated for each period in a scenario.  Investment on capital 
refers to the full upfront capital investment – for example, if a power plant is built in 2014 
at a total capital cost of $40 million and it will operate for thirty years, the investment cost 
of this plant will count as $40 million in the period 2011-2015 and will not be annualized 
over later periods. The capital cost factor and annual cost factor discount the values to 
the first year in the period. 
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Equation 5 Techno-Economic Cost Equation for CIMS 
                 
 (                                           )
 (                      )                      
Discount Rate = 5% 
Factor = 1 + discount rate = 1.05 
Annual Cost Factor = (factor^4 + factor^3 + factor^2 + factor + 1)/factor^5 = 4.33 
Capital Cost Factor = Annual Cost Factor / 5 = 0.87 
Following the calculation of TEC using Equation 5 for each period in the 
simulation (2001-2050), the TEC values are discounted to present value in year 2012 
using a 5% discount rate. A discount rate accounts for the fact that an opportunity cost 
exists for the investment of capital and that people generally perceive a future cost as 
lower than a present day cost. In other words, people perceive a future cost of $100 as 
less valuable than paying $100 today. Determining just how much lower keeps many 
economists busy. For policies that will mainly affect private consumption (as opposed to 
public expenditure), discount rates are typically determined by estimating the social 
opportunity cost of capital or the real rate of return on capital (Ward, 2006).  When the 
economy is growing fast, the discount rate is higher because the rate of return on capital 
investment is high. In the 1990s, when the US economy was growing faster compared to 
present times, discount rates used by the US government typically ranged from 7-10% 
(Morrison, 1998).  Post 2008-2009 recession, a discount rate between 3-7% is more 
typically applied (EIA, 2009; EPA&NHTSA, 2011b). The specific discount rate of 5% was 
chosen because this is the rate that the US Energy Information Administration recently 
used in estimating the cost of a clean electricity policy (EIA, 2010).   
Perceived Private Cost 
TEC is our best estimate of the known and average financial costs of mitigation, 
but it underestimates the cost of a policy because factors such as heterogeneity, risk, 
option value and consumer/firm preferences are not taken into account. The perceived 
private cost (PPC) measure was developed to incorporate these factors. The term 
“perceived private” cost refers to the estimate of costs as they would be perceived by 
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individuals and firms. As discussed further in the following paragraphs, perceived does 
not necessarily mean real ex poste costs. PPC is the total sum of all the costs depicted 
in Figure 2: engineering estimates, heterogeneity, risk, option value, consumers’ surplus, 
and false perceived costs due to market failures. PPC can be thought of as similar to the 
welfare cost estimates of top-down models, which also assume that all deviations from 
the BAU scenario will incur a cost.   
This method measures the perceived costs of a regulation through adding a 
“shadow price” on emissions or fuel consumption in the market share algorithm of CIMS 
(Equation 1 and Equation 2, pg. 26) for the technologies or energy services covered by a 
policy.  This shadow price is adjusted until the policy objective is achieved. By restricting 
or expanding the set of technologies with a shadow price, policies can be modelled in 
varying scales from economy-wide, to sector-wide, to technology-specific.  For example, 
if the policy objective is a technology regulation to phase out coal generation, a shadow 
price on the emissions from coal generation technologies would be set to effectively 
price coal generation out of the market.  Or if the policy is a sector-wide performance 
standard to achieve a certain emissions intensity of production, a shadow price on all 
GHG emissions in that sector would be applied to reach the specific performance 
standard.  
As policies become more stringent through time, the shadow price increases.  
For example, a clean electricity standard mandating 20% clean generation in 2015 will 
require a relatively low shadow price, and then as the target increases to say 80% clean 
generation in 2040, the shadow price will be quite high.  
Shadow prices represent the implicit marginal cost of achieving an objective 
with a particular policy. They can be used to construct a marginal abatement cost curve 
for a policy, which shows the amount of emissions reduced as a function of shadow price 
and time.  The perceived private cost of a policy is then calculated by finding the area 
under the marginal abatement cost curve for each time period.  Marginal abatement 
curves can also be used to calculate the PPC for energy efficiency policies by finding the 
amount of energy conserved from a shadow price on energy consumption.  See 
Appendix 2 for an example calculation of PPC. 
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Time is an important factor when plotting marginal abatement curves because 
an emission price of $10 will result in increasingly higher annual emission reductions the 
longer it is in place.  For example, a $10/t CO2e emission price in 2015 may only result in 
a 50 Mt CO2e annual emission reduction, but by 2030, the same $10/t CO2e emission 
price may have reduced annual emissions by 200 Mt CO2e.  The increasing impact of an 
emission price is a result of technology turnover.  As time goes by, more technologies 
reach their end life and need to be replaced, thus increasing the influence an emission 
price has on the acquisition of new, lower emission, technologies.  Figure 3 shows 
marginal abatement curves estimated by CIMS-US for a price on emissions in the 
personal vehicles sector. Note how an emission price of $240/tonne results in greater 
emission reductions in later simulation periods.   
Figure 3  Example - Marginal Abatement Curves for Personal Vehicle Sector 
 
 
The PPC method is underpinned by the classical economic assumption that 
consumers and firms are best informed about their true costs and thus the business as 
usual scenario represents their “least costly” path forward. Any policy that forces 
consumers and firms to deviate from the business as usual would then automatically 
incur additional costs on society.  While the TEC measure can find a policy that will 
produce savings for society, the PPC measure will never find a policy to result in cost 
savings.  
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 The area under the marginal abatement cost curve represents what businesses 
and consumers “perceive” to be their cost of reducing emissions. However, their 
perceptions can be incorrect if market failures exist that obscure their perceptions of 
cost.   
Jaffe & Stavins (1994) describe two market failures that affect adoption rates of 
energy-saving technologies: (1) lack of information, and (2) principal-agent problems (ex: 
landlord/tenant). If present, these market failures make consumers and firms perceive 
energy-saving technologies as more expensive, and thus increase the observed 
discount rate for technology investments. However, high revealed discount rates could 
also exist because consumers just truly have high discount rates for irreversible 
investments with uncertain paybacks. For example, future energy prices are uncertain 
and life-cycle energy savings can only be estimated (Hassett & Metcalf, 1993).   
Thus high revealed discount rates for any particular technology will be caused 
by some combination of market failure and uncertain paybacks. Separating the two 
influences requires well structured studies that are few and far between. Knowing the 
cause of high discount rates is not crucial for the simulation of technology choices – just 
having an estimate of revealed discount rates will enable more accurate simulation of 
behaviour.  But when the objective is to calculate the total cost of a policy after a 
simulation, the cause of high discount rates becomes relevant.  If revealed discount 
rates are artificially inflated by the presence of market failures, they are including false 
perceived costs. When included in a calculation of total cost, these false costs 
overestimate the real cost of a policy. 
While the common default assumption among economists is that consumers 
make optimal choices and thus revealed discount rates accurately represent private 
costs of an investment. An increasing number of research studies from the field of 
behavioural economics show that consumers often do not make optimal choices due to 
the presence of market failures.  For example, a research study by Moxnes (2004) 
indicates that a regulation to increase the energy efficiency of refrigerators would 
increase welfare on average for consumers because enough consumers were making 
non-optimal choices on account of information processing costs and lack of information 
on the energy efficiency of refrigerators. As well, Thaler & Sunstein’s book Nudge (2008) 
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details case after case where information processing costs lead to non-optimal choices. 
Thaler and Sunstein then argue for companies and governments to adopt a philosophy 
of “liberal paternalism” to carefully set the default choice in various arenas to minimize 
information processing costs and increase welfare of individuals and society.   
Since the perceived private cost method includes revealed discount rates, there 
is reason to believe that this method will overestimate the total cost of a policy.  
However, to reduce revealed discount rates for technologies to account for the presence 
of market failures would require a study equivalent to Moxnes (2004) for every 
technology in CIMS. Since resources do not allow for this level of empirical rigour, the 
Energy and Materials Research Group (EMRG) at SFU developed a short-cut technique: 
the Expected Resource Cost (ERC). The ERC is set to 75% of the distance between the 
TEC and the PPC (Equation 6).  The ERC thus assumes that 25% of the additional 
perceived cost of PPC compared to TEC is due to market failures and thus does not 
represent a real cost of implementing a policy (Murphy et al., 2007).  
Equation 6 Expected Resource Cost 
        [     (       )] 
The level of 75% was chosen because the EMRG group did not think that 
market failures would account for more than half the difference between TEC and PPC 
and thus chose 75% as a conservative estimate. One could critique the choice of 75% 
insofar as it is based on judgement and not direct empirical analysis, and this could be 
reason to revisit the method in the future.  Indeed Peters (2006) developed an 
alternative calculation method for ERC whereby an analyst can take the output from a 
CIMS simulation and then apply modified discount rates, intangible costs, and 
heterogeneity parameters that reflect the ex poste costs of technology switching as 
opposed to the perceived costs. However, for this method to be better than the 
conventional method, it requires empirical estimates of these parameters. For most 
technology choices, these parameters have not been estimated, thus for the purposes of 
this study, I chose to remain with the traditional method for calculating ERC.  
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4. Calibration & Model Settings of CIMS-US 
CIMS has developed over the last two decades in the Energy and Materials 
Research Group at Simon Fraser University. The model originated as discrete 
technology-specific sectoral models developed by the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory.  These “ISTUM sub-models” were given to EMRG and adapted to represent 
Canada by Mark Jaccard and John Nyboer (Nyboer, 1997). The Ph.D. research of Chris 
Bataille took the ISTUM sub-models and integrated them into one model with macro-
economic feedbacks, CIMS-Canada (Bataille, 2005). 
The Master’s research of Bill Tubbs modified the CIMS-Canada model to make 
CIMS-US (Tubbs, 2008).  CIMS-US has then been updated since by Suzanne Goldberg, 
Mike Wolinetz, Jotham Peters, Adam Baylin-Stern and myself for use in Stanford 
University’s Energy Modeling Forum 24 in 2011.  The Energy Information 
Administration’s Annual Energy Review (historical data) and Annual Energy Outlook 
(forecast) are used to calibrate CIMS-US.   
This chapter gives an overview of how CIMS-US compares to EIA’s historical 
data on primary energy consumption and GHG emissions.  The calibration of the 
electricity sector and personal transportation sector is examined in more detail, as the 
policies in this study are focused on these sectors.   
4.1. Economy-wide 
Table 1 compares total primary fossil fuel consumption for CIMS against the 
Annual Energy Review for years 2000 and 2010 (EIA, 2011a). Primary coal consumption 
in CIMS is within a 3% and 1% range of AER in periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010, 
respectively. Natural gas consumption is within 7% and 0% range of AER in periods 
2001-2005 and 2006-2010. CIMS primary petroleum consumption is considerably lower 
because AER includes petroleum feedstocks as part of primary energy consumption. 
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Table 1 Fossil Fuel Consumption, Economy-wide 
Average PJ/year for 5-year period 
 
 
 
Table 2 compares CO2 emissions in CIMS with historical data from the Annual 
Energy Review.  For the five year periods ending in 2005 and 2010, CIMS is within 2% 
and 3% of historical data, respectively. 
Table 2  CO2 Emissions from Energy Consumption 
Average Mt CO2/year for 5-year period 
 
4.2. Electricity Sector 
Table 3 presents a comparison of electricity generation in the CIMS business as 
usual scenario with historical and forecasted electricity generation.  The reference for 
years 2000-2010 is historical data from the Annual Energy Review 2010 (EIA, 2011a). 
The reference for years 2015-2035 is the forecasted generation by the Annual Energy 
Outlook 2011(EIA, 2011b).  
For the most part, CIMS is well calibrated from years 2000-2015 across the 
different types of generation fuels.  For instance, CIMS forecast for coal and nuclear 
generation in 2015 is within a 1% difference of the reference, and natural gas generation 
in CIMS for 2015 is about 7% higher than the AEO reference. However, from 2020-2035, 
Calibration Results for CIMS-US (Average PJ/year in period)
2001-2005 2006-2010 2001-2005 2006-2010 2001-2005 2006-2010
Annual Energy Review (2010) 23,507 22,808 24,189 24,846 35,904 34,813
CIMS   24,284 22,611 22,449 24,918 33,492 31,601
% Difference 3% -1% -7% 0% -7% -9%
Coal Natural Gas Petroleum
2001-2005 2006-2010
Annual Energy Review (2010) 5,879 5,767
CIMS 5,755 5,614
% Difference -2% -3%
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CIMS forecasts begin to diverge from AEO 2011.  CIMS forecasts that natural gas 
generation will replace coal generation, leading to a dramatic increase in total natural 
gas generation. In contrast, AEO 2011 forecasts coal generation will remain constant 
and natural gas generation will experience a more moderate increase. A factor 
contributing to the divergence is that CIMS forecasts a 25% increase in total generation 
between 2020 and 2035, and AEO 2011 forecasts an increase of only 7% during the 
same time period.  
Table 3 Electricity Generation by Fuel Type (Billion kWh) 
CIMS vs. AER (2000-2010) and AEO 2011 (2015-2035) 
 
 
The version of CIMS-US used for this study was calibrated using demand 
drivers from AEO 2011. CIMS level of total generation is calibrated to reference levels 
from 2000-2020, but then diverges from reference despite having the same economic 
drivers. This pattern suggests that the model used to generate the AEO 2011 forecast, 
NEMS, may be more optimistic that energy efficiency will increase into the future.  If 
Generation Fuel Model 2000 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Reference 1,911 1,868 1,822 1,825 1,825 1,825 1,827
CIMS 1,934 1,968 1,808 1,657 1,536 1,434 1,319
% Difference 1% 5% -1% -9% -16% -21% -28%
Reference 399 776 917 916 943 1054 1157
CIMS 399 689 982 1,322 1,708 2,118 2,654
% Difference 0% -11% 7% 44% 81% 101% 129%
Reference 98 43 37 38 41 43 48
CIMS 105 84 72 61 51 40 44
Reference 754 801 833 871 871 871 871
CIMS 750 841 845 849 853 855 859
% Difference 0% 5% 1% -3% -2% -2% -1%
Reference 271 262 293 301 305 308 311
CIMS 258 258 258 257 257 257 257
Reference 7 9 11 21 39 38 31
CIMS 9 10 9 9 8 9 12
Reference 14 15 20 25 31 42 49
CIMS 14 20 21 23 26 31 38
Reference 0.49 0.83 2.85 3.08 3.36 3.66 3.97
CIMS 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.64 2.84
Reference 6 57 143 143 151 157 161
CIMS 6 23 24 27 32 40 53
Reference 3,473 3,767 4,103 4,175 4,225 4,350 4,475
CIMS 3,481 3,900 4,028 4,213 4,481 4,796 5,251
% Difference 0% 4% -2% 1% 6% 10% 17%
Total Generation
Wind
Solar
Geothermal
Biomass
Conventional Hydro
Other Fossil Fuel
Natural Gas
Coal
Fossil Fuels
Nuclear
Renewables
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anything, this makes the CIMS business as usual scenario more conservative than the 
reference scenario of AEO 2011. 
While differences in total generation levels explains some of the diverging 
forecasts in natural gas generation and coal generation, it does not explain all of it. The 
version of CIMS used in this study has equivalent capital, operating, and fuel costs for 
coal and natural gas generation as AEO 2011, so differences in costs of these 
technologies is not a reason for diverging trends. One possible reason could be that 
NEMS has a longer life for coal plants than CIMS. Coal plants can often last longer than 
their official timeline, especially since considerable opposition exists to building new coal 
plants. Another possible reason is that EIA experiences political pressure to not show a 
rapid decline of coal. Consequently, EIA may constrain their model to achieve constant 
coal generation.  Yet another reason could be that the electricity sector in EIA’s model 
has 22 regions, and is thus considering more regional factors than CIMS-US, which is 
only one region.  Examining this issue further was not within the scope of this project, but 
would be good to look into for future updates of CIMS-US.    
Cost of Generation 
For the purposes of this report, levelized cost of generation for each technology, 
t, is defined in Equation 7, and is the sum of annualized capital, operating and energy 
costs, divided by total annual output.   
Equation 7 Levelized Cost of Generation ($/MWh) 
                               
                
       
 
CCt – Capital Cost of Generation Plant 
CRF- Capital Recovery Factor with discount rate of 12.5% 
OCt – Operating Cost of Generation Plant 
ECt – Energy Cost of Generation Plant 
Outputt – Output of Generation Plant 
Table 4 shows the levelized costs of electricity generation in CIMS for year 
2010 compared with the costs used in the NEMS model for AEO 2011(EIA, 2011b).  
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These levelized costs are the base costs in CIMS and thus they will change according to 
changes in fuel prices and capital costs. Coal, natural gas, nuclear, biomass, and 
geothermal generation costs in CIMS are based off of the NEMS costs, thus they have a 
0% difference.  Wind and solar generation technologies are based on cost curves from 
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.  While Solar PV is substantially higher than 
EIA in year 2010, the cost of PV in CIMS decreases with its increased installation. CCS 
costs for CIMS-US are currently being updated, so updated costs could not be included 
in this study.   
Table 4 Levelized Cost of Generation in 2010 ($US2010/MWh) 
 
Cost Dynamics 
Estimating future generation costs for new renewable technologies and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) is complex because both upward and downward cost 
pressures are at work.  As discussed in Section 3.1, most new technologies experience 
declining capital costs as their production increases. The nature of renewable generation 
and CCS means these technologies are likely to also face upward cost pressures as 
their total stock increases.  
The first upward cost pressure is related to the site-specific nature of renewable 
and CCS generation. Whereas natural gas, coal, and nuclear plants can be constructed 
anywhere, renewable generation must be constructed where the resource is, i.e. where 
CIMS EIA (2011)* % Difference
Pulverized Coal 81.1 81.1 0%
PC with CCS 148.2 131.0 13%
Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle 93.5 93.5 0%
IGCC with CCS 109.5 130.7 -16%
Natural Gas Combined Cycle 56.7 56.7 0%
NGCC with CCS 117.9 85.8 37%
Natural Gas Single Cycle 123.7 123.7 0%
Nuclear 105.4 105.4 0%
Biomass 122.0 122.0 0%
Geothermal 106.9 106.9 0%
Large Hydro 56.1 87.6 -36%
Small Hydro 112.4 0.0 -
Wind 113.9 114.8 -1%
Solar Thermal 242.9 423.7 -43%
Solar PV 429.9 287.2 50%
*The EIA (2011) levelized costs in this table use capital and operating costs from EIA (2010), but use energy costs and 
discount rate (12.5%) from CIMS to facilitate comparison.  
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the wind blows or the water flows. CCS is also site-limited, requiring construction near 
storage reservoirs or near a CO2 pipeline to a reservoir. The most favourable of these 
sites are developed first, and then development moves on to less favourable, higher cost 
sites.  A site is more favourable the stronger the resource, the easier it is to access, and 
the closer it is to where the power will be used.   
A second upward cost pressure is related to the low energy density of 
renewables, which means that renewable generation is more land-intensive than 
conventional types of generation. As renewable generation expands, it will increasingly 
face competition by alternative land uses (Green, 2000; Jaccard, 2005b). For instance 
increasing numbers of proposals for solar thermal generation in California are running up 
against challenges for these plants to receive adequate water rights for cooling purposes 
(Woody, 2009).  According to a database managed by the US Chamber of Commerce, in 
March 2010, 149 renewable energy projects in the US were stalled, delayed or blocked 
by a combination of protracted regulatory reviews, local opposition, and lawsuits (Harder, 
2012).    
Wind generation is generally thought to experience the greatest variability in the 
quality of its resource compared to other renewable generation technologies. Accessible 
sites with strong and stable wind patterns are limited. These good sites are used first 
and then expanding wind generation means moving into inferior sites with a less stable 
wind resource.  For these reasons, CIMS includes an increasing cost dynamic on wind 
generation. With increased use of wind generation, capital costs of wind turbines 
decline, but the cost of siting a wind farm increases.  When these two dynamics are put 
together, wind generation has a slight decrease in levelized costs as production 
increases, thus the influence of declining capital costs is stronger than the increasing 
siting costs. Table 5 shows the net effect on the levelized cost of wind for a scenario 
where wind generation increases 20 times 2010 levels by 2050. 
The two solar generation technologies in CIMS, solar photovoltaics (PV) and 
solar thermal, are only subject to a declining capital cost function. An increasing capital 
cost function is not included since the quality of the solar resource is more dependable 
than wind.  Table 5 shows that by 2035 the levelized cost of solar PV and solar thermal 
can decline more than 50% from their 2010 levels in a CIMS simulation.  But this level of 
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cost decline will not be the case in every CIMS simulation – declining capital costs of 
solar depend on their cumulative production as determined by the economic and policy 
drivers within a CIMS scenario. 
Table 5 Declining Solar and Wind Generation Costs in CIMS Reference Case 
 
Nuclear Generation 
Without a price on carbon, the levelized price of nuclear generation is higher 
than coal and natural gas. However, when climate change policy is implemented, 
nuclear generation quickly becomes the cheapest and most reliable alternative to fossil 
fuel generation. If CIMS based the choice of new generation technology purely on 
levelized costs, nuclear generation would increase substantially under a climate change 
policy.  However, levelized cost of generation is only one component in the decision to 
build a nuclear power plant.  Perceptions of risk, both investment risk and safety risk, 
often drive decisions around nuclear power. Joskow (2006) explains that the numerous 
problems that arose in building the current fleet of nuclear reactors continues to shape 
business perceptions around this technology. These problems include lengthy licensing 
processes, large construction cost overruns, long construction periods, high operation 
and maintenance costs, the need for early replacement of steam generators and other 
major pieces of equipment, and public opposition to construction in several regions in 
the country. In addition, a long-term plan for the disposal of nuclear waste does not exist. 
For these reasons, no new nuclear plants started construction between 1979, when 
there was an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, and 2007. 
 That said, as of 2012, construction has begun on five new nuclear generation 
units at three sites (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2012) and the current federal 
administration is supportive of increasing nuclear generation. In December 2011, the 
Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu stated “The Administration and the Energy 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total Stock (TWh) 0.00 0.05 1.39 19 45
Levelized Cost ($US2010/Mwh) 243 177 130 108 108
Total Stock (TWh) 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.63 7
Levelized Cost ($US2010/Mwh) 430 303 215 154 124
Total Stock (TWh) 20 91 192 307 399
Levelized Cost ($US2010/Mwh) 114 111 108 108 108
Wind
Solar Thermal
Solar PV
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Department are committed to restarting America’s nuclear industry – creating thousands 
of jobs in the years ahead and powering our nation’s homes and businesses with 
domestic, low-carbon energy.”  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also certified a new 
nuclear reactor design, Westinghouse Electric’s AP1000, and the federal administration 
committed an $8.33 billion conditional loan guarantee for construction of two of these 
reactors in Georgia (Brown, 2012).  Reflecting the more positive political environment for 
nuclear power, the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook projects 
nuclear generation will increase from 101.5 gigawatts in 2009 to 110.5 gigawatts in 2035 
for their reference scenario.  They also have a scenario where an economy-wide GHG 
price is applied and in this case, nuclear generation increases by 29 gigawatts from 
2010-2035, or about 230 TWh/year. 
For this study, a new market share limit of 20% is placed on nuclear generation, 
meaning in any given CIMS period when generation technologies compete to supply 
new demands for electricity, nuclear can only win 20% of the new demands for 
generation technology.  In the policy scenarios, nuclear generation supplies up to 21% of 
total generation in 2015 to 30% of total generation in 2050, which works out to an 
additional generation above 2015 levels of 1,050 TWh/year by 2050. This level of 
nuclear generation is higher than the AEO forecasts under a climate change policy, but 
the electricity policies in this study are much more ambitious – achieving 80% zero-
emission generation by 2050.  
Intermittent Renewable Generation and Storage Costs 
The typical approach to comparing generation technologies is through life-cycle 
production costs per unit of electricity supplied. Indeed, CIMS uses this levelized cost 
approach. Joskow (2011) criticizes the levelized cost method as misleading when 
comparisons are made between intermittent (wind and solar) and dispatchable (natural 
gas, coal, nuclear, biomass) generation technologies. The method is flawed, states 
Joskow, because it treats all MWhs supplied as a homogeneous product governed by 
one price, when in reality, the value of electricity (wholesale market price) varies over the 
day and over the year.  For example, the difference between high and low prices over a 
typical year can be up to four orders of magnitude. 
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In response to this valid critique, I added a storage cost to the intermittent 
renewable generation technologies to represent the cost of storing intermittent power. 
The logic being that storing intermittent power makes it more comparable to dispatchable 
power. Jaccard (2005b) states that the added cost of energy storage is estimated to be 
about 1-2 ¢/kWh. Since I am trying to represent a conservative cost estimate, I added a 
2¢/kWh storage cost to all intermittent generation technologies. However, this may 
actually be an optimistic estimate of storage costs, as more recent research estimates 
the cost is 5¢/kWh ($US2006) and above (Poonpun and Jewell, 2008).  
4.3. Transportation Sector 
For the transportation sector, Table 6 shows how CIMS fuel consumption in the 
business as usual scenario compares to reference values, which include the freight and 
personal transportation sectors. The reference values for years 2005 and 2010 are 
historical data from the Annual Energy Review 2010 (EIA, 2011a). The reference values 
for 2015 onwards are from the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2011b).  Petroleum and 
total fuel consumption in most years is within a 3% difference of reference values.  
Similar to the electricity sector, CIMS forecasts fuel switching to natural gas in the 
transportation sector and AEO 2011 does not. All of this fuel switching to natural gas is 
occurring in the CIMS freight transportation sector, not in personal transportation.   
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Table 6 Transportation Fuel, CIMS vs. AER 2010 and AEO 2011 
 
Refined petroleum is the dominant fuel in this sector. As shown at the bottom of 
Table 6, the AER 2010 states that petroleum consumption is over 99% of total energy 
consumption for 2005 and 2010.  AEO 2011 forecasts a slight decrease in petroleum 
consumption as a percentage of total over 20 years – from 99.7% in 2015 to 95% in 
2035.  CIMS forecasts a greater decrease in petroleum consumption as a percentage of 
total consumption as a result of more fuel switching from petroleum to natural gas – from 
97% in 2015 to 88% in 2035.  
For the business as usual scenario of personal vehicle technologies, AEO 2011 
is more optimistic about the uptake of alternatives to the internal combustion engine 
(ICE) than CIMS-US. Table 7 compares the market share of personal vehicle engines in 
CIMS-US to AEO 2011. This table gives two values for CIMS-US, one is the market 
share when intangible costs are included on the new engine technologies (hybrid, 
electric, etc), and the other is the CIMS-US market share when the intangible costs are 
removed. The CIMS-US used in this study includes the intangible costs on the engines. 
With these intangible costs, CIMS forecasts the market share of gasoline engines to be 
99% in 2015, decreasing to 93% in 2035. AEO 2011 forecasts gasoline engines to be 
86% in 2015, decreasing to 70% in 2035.  Part of this discrepancy is that CIMS only 
Transportation Fuel, CIMS vs. AER 2010 (2005-2010) and AEO 2011 (2015-2035)
AER 2010 AEO 2011
Transportation Fuel (PJ) 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Reference 28,812 27,058 29,278 29,415 29,362 30,080 31,293
CIMS 28,688 27,627 28,424 29,499 29,911 29,676 29,608
% Difference 0% 2% -3% 0% 2% -1% -5%
Reference 2 8 42 74 106 148 169
CIMS 6 3 27 118 497 2,125 3,823
Reference - - 11 338 981 1,245 1,298
CIMS 4 6 24 48 103 149 178
Reference 27 28 32 42 53 63 74
CIMS 90 94 107 120 138 156 176
Reference 28,849 27,177 29,362 29,869 30,512 31,536 32,844
CIMS 28,789 27,749 28,631 29,856 30,749 32,214 33,911
% Difference 0% 2% -2% 0% 1% 2% 3%
Reference 99.9% 99.6% 99.7% 98.5% 96.2% 95.4% 95.3%
CIMS 99.6% 99.6% 99.3% 98.8% 97.3% 92.1% 87.3%
Total
% Petroleum of   
Total Fuel
Petroleum
Natural Gas
E85
Electricity
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counts E85 vehicles that are actually fueled with E85 fuel. AEO 2011 counts all E85 
capable vehicles on the road, whether or not they use E85 fuel.   
Car companies have an incentive to produce E85 vehicles because they help in 
meeting the federal corporate average fuel economy standard. When calculating the fuel 
economy of E85 vehicles, the government currently only includes the 15% of the fuel 
that is gasoline. However, E85 vehicles can be fueled with E85 fuel or standard 
gasoline, and consumers have a cost incentive to prefer gasoline over E85 fuel. 
Nationally, E85 fuel is about 15% lower in price per gallon than gasoline (e85prices.com, 
2012). However, E85 has 28% less energy content than gasoline.  Additionally, E85 
availability is considerably lower than gasoline, with only 1,950 outlets offering E85 fuel 
in 2009 compared to 121,446 total gasoline outlets across the US (Lane, 2011).   
One way to estimate the level of E85 fuel used by E85 vehicles is to compare 
the market share of E85 fuel to the market share of E85 vehicles within the total vehicle 
fleet. The EIA (2011c) estimates that consumption of E85 fuel represented 0.004% of 
total vehicle fuel consumption, while a conservative estimate of E85 vehicles 
represented 0.205% of vehicles in use in 2009, or about 500,000 vehicles. This estimate 
for E85 vehicles in use is likely underestimated by the EIA because they only count E85 
vehicles that will likely be using E85 fuels, primarily fleet-operated vehicles. This analysis 
estimates that only 5% of total E85 vehicles sold are fueled with E85 fuel, thus 95% of 
these vehicles are thought to be fueled with gasoline. Considering these estimates from 
EIA(2011), the CIMS forecast of 1% of vehicle travel by E85 vehicles actually fueled with 
E85 fuel seems to be in the correct vicinity.  
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Table 7 Total Market Share of Personal Vehicle Engines 
AEO 2011 vs. CIMS with and without Intangible Costs on Engines 
 
 
 Another factor contributing to the difference between the CIMS and AEO 2011 
forecast in vehicle engine type is that CIMS has considerable intangible costs on new 
vehicle technologies.  These intangible costs were set to prevent hybrid and plug-in 
hybrid vehicles from getting unrealistic market shares in later periods. Referring back to 
Table 7, examine the values highlighted by the grey bar for year 2035.  With no 
intangible costs, the market share for hybrids and plug-in hybrids spike to 10% and 15% 
respectively in this period, well above the AEO 2011 projections for these categories. 
Intangible costs were added to these vehicle types to bring them below the AEO 2011 
forecast, thus ensuring a conservative business as usual projection. 
 
Engine Type 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
AEO 2011* 86% 80% 75% 72% 70%
CIMS - with IC 97% 97% 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 87%
CIMS - w/0 IC 95% 95% 93% 82% 69% 56% 43% 39%
AEO 2011 2% 3% 3% 4% 4%
Diesel ICE CIMS - with IC 2% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
CIMS - w/0 IC 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2%
AEO 2011 2% 3% 3% 4% 5%
Hybrid CIMS - with IC 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 5% 6%
CIMS - w/0 IC 0% 0% 1% 1% 10% 20% 30% 35%
AEO 2011 0% 0% 1% 1% 2%
Plug-in Hybrid CIMS - with IC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
CIMS - w/0 IC 0% 0% 1% 11% 15% 20% 23% 22%
AEO 2011 10% 14% 17% 18% 19%
Ethanol (E85) ICE CIMS - with IC 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
CIMS - w/0 IC 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0%
AEO 2011 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6%
Pure electric CIMS - with IC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
CIMS - w/0 IC 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
*Annual Energy Outlook 2011, Reference Case, Table: "Light-Duty Vehicle Miles Traveled by Technology Type"
Gasoline ICE
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Transportation Mode 
 For personal transportation, the CIMS energy demand service is person 
kilometers traveled per year. For urban travel, four different modes of travel compete to 
supply this service: vehicles with just a driver, high occupancy vehicles, transit, and 
walking/cycling.  When shadow prices are used to simulate a VES and CAFE standard, 
the shadow price is included in the market share algorithm, making driving a vehicle 
considerably more expensive vis-à-vis the other urban transportation modes.  If the four 
modes are allowed to compete, substantial mode shifting occurs – such as transit going 
from 4% to 40% market share. However, the shadow price only represents the perceived 
cost of forcing a switch in technology, it is not actually paid by someone buying a vehicle, 
so it should not cause this level of mode shifting to occur.  
To address this issue, I fixed the urban transportation modes so that they could 
not compete with each other. If a VES or CAFE standard was simulated with another 
method that did not affect the market share algorithm, mode shifting would occur, as 
consumers are being forced to buy vehicles that they would not otherwise choose to buy 
due to their high perceived cost.  Thus by not allowing mode shifting, the cost of these 
policies will be higher, and thus this setting makes the cost estimate more conservative. 
4.4. General Model Settings 
Table 8 lists the CIMS’ settings for simulating the business as usual and policy 
scenarios in this study. The first of these two settings, Energy Supply & Demand and 
CIMS Macro, are the two main macro-economic processes than can be turned on and 
off. The Energy Supply & Demand function allows for the supply and price of fuels to 
reflect changes in their demand.  For supply and fuel prices to actually change from their 
exogenous setting, other fuel-specific settings also have to be activated. For example, 
balancing the domestic supply of coal is only done if the Constant Coal Production 
setting is turned off, otherwise, coal is mined according to its exogenous supply 
schedule.   
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Table 8 General Model Settings 
 
Note that for coal, crude, and natural gas, the constant production setting is 
turned off, and for refined petroleum products (RPP), it is turned on. The reasoning 
behind these settings is that domestically produced coal, crude and natural gas are 
mostly consumed by the United States. They are not large export commodities. Thus 
their supply is responsive to domestic climate change policies that decrease the demand 
for fossil fuels.  On the other hand, refined petroleum products could become a large 
export commodity of the United States if climate change policy reduced demand for 
these products at home, especially since the United States has a large refining industry. 
The world demand of RPPs would only decrease if enough other countries also 
implement climate change policies. Since future climate change policies in other 
countries are uncertain, especially those of developing countries, I make the 
conservative assumption that international demand for oil remains at forecasted levels. 
The implication of this assumption is that reduction in output of RPPs is not an option for 
reducing emissions in the policy scenarios.  GHG emission reductions in the RPP sector 
will only occur through technology or fuel switching. 
For fuel prices to change from their exogenous forecast in CIMS, the 
Endogenous Pricing parameter needs to be turned on.  Note that endogenous pricing is 
turned on only for secondary energy sources, namely, electricity, refined petroleum, 
CIMS Setting Setting
Energy Supply & Demand On
CIMS Macro On
Energy Trade Off
Constant Coal Production Off
Constant Crude Production Off
Constant Natural Gas Production Off
Constant RPP Production On
Coal Endogenous Pricing Off
Crude Endogenous Pricing Off
Electricity Endogenous Pricing On
Natural Gas Endogenous Pricing Off
RPP Endogenous Pricing On
Ethanol Endogenous Pricing On
Biodiesel Endogenous Pricing On
GHG Precognition Off
Revenue Recycling On
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ethanol, and biodiesel. Primary energy is set to exogenous pricing. The reason behind 
these settings is that the price of primary energy sources is set on the world market and 
thus would only be marginally affected by a climate change policy in the United States.  
Secondary energy consumed in the United States is also mostly produced in the United 
States, thus the price of secondary energy sources will be more affected by domestic 
climate change policy than primary energy sources. 
The CIMS Macro setting determines whether the output of the energy demand 
sectors is responsive to changes in the cost of energy services. When the CIMS Macro 
is turned on, output levels of sectors can change in response to a climate change policy. 
Each demand sector has an exogenous output based on reference growth forecasts, 
such as the Annual Energy Outlook.   For example, the residential sector’s output is 
number of households. The Iron & Steel sector’s output is tonnes of steel.  CIMS only 
represents the cost of production for this output in relation to the cost of energy services 
needed for producing a unit of output.  Through determining what percentage energy 
services makes up in the total cost of production, an estimate can be made as to 
changes in the total cost of production due to a change in energy service cost.  CIMS 
then takes this estimate for the change in total cost of production and applies a price 
elasticity function to get the change in demand for this output. Under an ambitious 
climate change policy, the cost of production in most sectors will increase, and thus 
demand will decrease.  The level of decrease in demand depends on the price elasticity 
of demand for the product.   
The last two settings in Table 8, GHG Precognition and Revenue Recycling, 
relate to the treatment of emission charges. If GHG Precognition is turned on, the GHG 
emission charges of future periods will be considered within the market share algorithm. 
For this study, GHG Precognition was turned off since most of the policies are not direct 
emission charges. These policies are simulated in the model as shadow emission or fuel 
charges, but they are actually regulations or tradable performance standards.  For 
purposes of consistency and ease of simulation, GHG Precognition is also set to off for 
the carbon tax policies. 
When Revenue Recycling is turned on, the revenue raised from emission 
charges, including shadow emission charges, is returned to the sector from which it was 
   55 
raised. In this way, the payment of emission charges is not included in the cost of 
production for a sector, and thus output and energy prices are not directly affected by 
emission charges.  However, an indirect effect of emission charges still exists since they 
influence changes in capital, operating, and fuel expenditure, which in turn impacts cost 
of production. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
This section presents estimates on the cost of different policy options for 
reducing GHG emissions in the United States. Using the CIMS-US model described in 
Sections 3.1 and 4, three sets of policy scenarios were simulated, for a total of ten policy 
scenarios.  The first set of policies relates to the electricity sector, the second to the 
personal transportation sector and the third set considers the simultaneous 
implementation of policies in the electricity and transportation sectors.   
Within each set, the policies achieve equivalent GHG emission reductions in 
each period, which is achieved by simulating one of the policies in the set, and then 
configuring the stringency of the other policies in the set to match the emission 
reductions of the base policy.  Matching GHG emissions of policy scenarios requires 
running iterative simulations of a policy through CIMS-US until the settings of a policy 
achieves the required emission reductions.   
Recall from Section 3.2 that CIMS enables the calculation of three distinct cost 
measures for policies – the first measure is the techno-economic cost (TEC) measure, 
representing the ‘bottom-up’ or engineering costing methodology, and the second 
measure is the perceived private cost (PPC) measure, representing the ‘top-down’ or 
economist costing methodology. The PPC measure can be interpreted as an “upper 
bound” or conservative cost estimate. Most likely, the actual cost of implementing these 
policies would be lower.  The Energy and Materials Research Group’s best estimate of 
the “true cost” of these policies is the third measure – the expected resource cost (ERC).  
The ERC adjusts the PPC downwards to account for false perceptions of cost included 
in the PPC. The ERC is calculated by taking the TEC and adding 75% of the difference 
between the PPC and the TEC.  
Unless otherwise noted, all representation of policy cost in this section is 
relative to the business as usual (BAU) scenario, and is denominated in $US2010 
(including costs represented in text, tables and figures). To enable the comparison of 
   57 
costs over different time periods, costs are discounted to their present value in 2012 
using an annual discount rate of 5%.  The costs presented in all figures represent the 
total cost of implementing a policy over a five year period (note the period 2011-2015 is 
just represented as “2015” and so on).  Negative cost numbers can be thought of as 
savings relative to the BAU scenario. Marginal GHG tax rates are in $US2010 and are 
not discounted. 
Below, results for each set of policies are reported and analysed in turn. Firstly, 
results are presented on the policy configurations that CIMS-US estimates would 
achieve equivalent GHG emission reductions.  Secondly, the cost of implementing these 
policies is compared and explained. 
5.1. Electricity Policies 
This section compares the total cost of two policies that are focused on the 
electricity sector with each other and against an economy-wide GHG tax.  The first policy 
is a technology performance standard that leads to the phase out of conventional fossil 
fuel generation (Conv. FF Phase-out). This policy first prohibits oil generation and new 
coal generation without carbon capture and storage (CCS) after 2015 and then prohibits 
new natural gas generation without CCS after 2030, thus leading to a phasing out of 
conventional coal and natural gas from the generation mix.  The second policy is a clean 
electricity standard (CES) that mandates a certain percentage of total generation must 
be from zero-emission sources.  Renewable and nuclear generation, and 90% of fossil 
fuel generation with CCS is considered to be zero-emission generation.  The CES is set 
to achieve equivalent emission reductions as US1.  The third policy is an economy-wide 
tax on GHG emissions that results in the same level of emission reductions, economy-
wide, as the Conv. FF Phase-out and CES policies.   
Table 9 outlines the configuration of these policies in greater detail and shows 
the difference between the BAU scenario and the policy scenario.  For the Conv. FF 
Phase-out, coal generation begins to decrease relative to the BAU after 2015, and 
natural gas generation decreases after 2030. To match the GHG emission reductions 
from a phase out of conventional fossil fuel generation, CIMS-US finds that a clean 
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electricity standard needs to be 81% by 2050 and an economy-wide tax needs to be 
$124 / tonne CO2e.  
Table 9 Policies – Electricity Sector 
 
 
Table 10 Annual Economy-wide GHG Emissions (Gt CO2e)  
and % Reduction from 2005 GHG Emissions 
 
As shown in  
Table 10, the emission reductions from the CES and GHG tax follow the same 
path as the phase-out of conventional fossil fuel generation. Each of these policies 
stabilizes emissions at 2005 levels in 2030, and achieves a 15% reduction in GHG 
emissions from 2005 levels by 2050.  CIMS-US forecasts GHG emissions for the BAU 
scenario in 2030 as 2% above 2005 emissions, and 2050 emissions are forecasted to be 
Conv. FF Phase-out 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal Generation BAU 1,807 1,656 1,433 1,273 1,404
(TWh/year) Policy 1,807 1,578 1,097 446 13
Natural Gas Generation BAU 982 1,321 2,114 3,257 4,226
(TWh/year) Policy 982 1,401 2,462 1,442 760
CES 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 29% 28% 25% 22% 18%
Policy 29% 28% 28% 58% 81%
GHG Tax - Match Elec 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 0 0 0 0 0
Policy 0 2 16 121 124
% Clean Electricity
 $US2010/tonne CO2e
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.9
-2% -1% 2% 9% 21%
Conv. FF Phase-out 6.4 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.6
-2% -1% 0% -12% -15%
CES 6.4 6.5 6.4 5.8 5.6
-2% -1% -2% -12% -15%
GHG Tax - Match Elec 6.4 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.6
-2% -1% -1% -11% -15%
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21% above 2005 levels. Since each policy results in equivalent emission reductions, the 
economic impact of these policies can be compared. 
The total present value (PV) costs of the first set of policies are presented in 
Table 11.  As expected, both the TEC measure and the PPC measure find that the 
technology regulation of phasing out conventional fossil fuel generation would be the 
most costly method of reducing GHG emissions.  However, the PPC estimates the cost 
of this policy to be about three times the amount than the TEC measure over the period 
2016-2050, thus highlighting the different definitions of “cost” employed by these two 
measures.   
By the TEC, the total cost of the FF phase-out and the CES is relatively similar, 
but by the PPC, the CES is less than half the cost of the FF phase-out. The difference 
between the PPC and the TEC is the amount of intangible costs of a policy.  While the 
FF phase-out has about $1 trillion of intangible costs over the simulation period, the CES 
has just under $300 billion.  
The ERC estimates the total PV cost of the phase-out of coal and natural gas 
generation to be $1,214 billion over the 35 year simulation period, or $35 billion a year 
on average. The total ERC for the clean electricity standard is estimated to be $598 
billion over 35 years, or $17 billion a year on average. The economy-wide GHG tax is 
estimated to be $314 billion, or $9 billion a year on average.  Thus compared to the tax, 
the technology regulation is estimated to be about 4 times more costly, and the clean 
electricity standard is found to be about 2 times more costly.  
Note that the cost measures for the GHG tax do not represent the revenue 
generated by the tax and then transferred back to society. This revenue is considered a 
transfer and not a cost.  The TEC cost measure represents the change in expenditure on 
capital, operating and energy costs under a GHG tax relative to the BAU. The PPC cost 
measure for the GHG tax is the amount of certain and intangible cost firms and 
consumers are willing to incur to avoid paying the tax. 
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Table 11 Total Cost - Electricity Policies 
 
Total Cost of Policy (US$2010 Billions, discounted to 2012 at r = 5%)
Techno-Economic Cost 2016-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
Conv. FF Phase-out 522 15 235%
CES 384 11 147%
GHG Tax - Match Elec 156 4 0%
Perceived Private Cost 2016-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
Conv. FF Phase-out 1,445 41 294%
CES 670 19 83%
GHG Tax - Match Elec 367 10 0%
Expected Resource Cost 2016-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
Conv. FF Phase-out 1,214 35 287%
CES 598 17 91%
GHG Tax - Match Elec 314 9 0%
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Figure 4 Total Cost – Electricity Policies 
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Figure 4 compares the cost measures for each separate policy. For the Conv. 
FF Phase-out, Figure 4a shows the PPC and TEC measures to be relatively close from 
2016-2030, with both measures estimating relatively low costs for the phase-out of 
conventional coal in this period. These low costs can be explained because most new 
installations of generation capacity are forecasted to be natural gas combined cycle 
technology, not coal generation. Thus a phase-out of coal during this period is only 
forcing a small divergence from the business as usual scenario. The two measures then 
increase substantially in 2035 as a result of the requirement to phase out natural gas, as 
this is a significant divergence from the BAU scenario. The two measures also 
differentiate substantially from 2040-2050, indicating substantial intangible costs during 
these periods.   
While a marked difference exists for the Conv. FF Phase-out between TEC and 
PPC, Figure 4b shows the two measures have similar estimates of cost for the clean 
electricity standard.  Since the TEC for these two policy scenarios are similar, but the 
PPC costs are quite different, the conclusion can be drawn that FF Phase-out has 
substantially more intangible costs than the CES. 
Higher intangible costs for the FF Phase-out are likely a function of the CIMS 
heterogeneity parameter, which accounts for the fact that costs vary from one decision 
making situation and location to another. Inclusion of this parameter in the market share 
algorithm means that even if the average cost of a technology is expected to be quite 
high compared to other substitutes, the technology will still receive a small market share 
to represent the diversity of situations. The relevance of this for modeling technology 
phase-out policies within CIMS is that a substantial shadow emissions charge must be 
placed on a technology to bring its new market share from 1% to 0%, and a higher 
shadow emissions charge means higher perceived private cost (discussed further in 
Section 6.2).  Furthermore, in 2031, the Cov. FF Phase-out policy demands no new 
market share of two technologies which formerly made up the majority of market share.  
In adding a shadow emissions charge to phase out conventional natural gas, I also had 
to raise the shadow emission charge I placed on conventional coal technologies, 
demonstrating how the simultaneous phase out of both of these technologies is more 
costly than just summing up the cost of phasing out both of these technologies 
independently.  
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Looking at the generation mix of the electricity policies in Table 12 for the 2050 
period, note how the policy to phase-out conventional fossil fuel generation has a 0% 
market share for coal and the CES still has a 1% market share for coal. Part of the 
reason the CES has smaller intangible costs is because of the value associated with 
allowing a small amount of market share of a technology.  
Table 12 Generation Mix - Electricity Policies 
 
 
The generation mix also indicates other reasons why the phase-out of 
conventional fossil fuel generation has higher costs than the CES. Compared to the FF 
phase-out, the CES scenario has a lower percentage zero-emission generation in 2040 
and 2050, higher emissions intensity in 2050, and greater total generation in 2040 and 
2050.  Yet these two scenarios have equivalent GHG emissions at the economy-wide 
level in 2040 and 2050.  This seeming discrepancy can be explained by two factors (1) 
the difference these two scenarios have over the electricity price, and (2) the increased 
consumption of CCS under the FF phase-out.   
Firstly, electricity price increases under the FF phase-out are higher than the 
CES after 2031, inducing a greater switch away from electricity consumption to direct 
natural gas generation in the residential and commercial sectors. For example, space 
and water heating fueled by electricity can be switched to natural gas. Indeed, this fuel 
Conv. FF Phase-out 2020 2030 2040 2050 CES 2020 2030 2040 2050
Fossil Fuels 72% 75% 37% 15% Fossil Fuels 72% 72% 41% 18%
Coal 37% 23% 8% 0% Coal 38% 24% 6% 1%
Natural Gas 33% 51% 26% 12% Natural Gas 32% 47% 34% 15%
10% CCS 0% 0% 2% 2% 10% CCS 0% 0% 1% 1%
Other 1% 1% 1% 1% Other 1% 1% 1% 1%
Zero-Emission 28% 25% 63% 85% Zero-Emission 28% 28% 59% 82%
Nuclear 20% 18% 25% 30% Nuclear 20% 18% 24% 29%
90% CCS 0% 0% 16% 22% 90% CCS 0% 0% 8% 12%
Hydro 6% 6% 6% 7% Hydro 6% 6% 6% 7%
Wind 1% 1% 13% 19% Wind 1% 3% 16% 25%
Solar 0% 0% 2% 5% Solar 0% 0% 3% 7%
Biomass 0% 0% 0% 1% Biomass 0% 0% 1% 1%
Geothermal 1% 1% 1% 1% Geothermal 1% 1% 1% 1%
Total Generation (TWh) 4217 4822 5562 6344 Total Generation (TWh) 4213 4778 5592 6407
Emissions Intensity 484 403 190 72 Emissions Intensity 485 388 188 80
(kt C02e/TWh) (kt C02e/TWh)
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switching results in a 250 PJ increase in natural gas consumption in the energy demand 
sectors (residential, commercial, and industrial), corresponding to a 13 Mt CO2e 
difference in emissions.  
The other factor is that the FF phase-out policy results in substantially more 
CCS generation. While 90% of GHG emissions from CCS generation are captured, 
emissions associated with increased natural gas and coal extraction are not captured, 
resulting in the emissions of 50 Mt CO2e more from energy supply sectors compared to 
the CES.   The CES has less CCS generation for two reasons: (1) the CES allows for 
higher natural gas generation from 2030-2050, (2) 10% of CCS generation is not 
counted as “zero-emission” thus CCS in a CES is at a competitive disadvantage to CCS 
in the FF technology phase-out. 
In summary, since the Conv. FF phase-out policy has greater indirect effects on 
emissions in other sectors, the CES can achieve the same amount of emission 
reductions economy-wide with less effort, i.e. smaller % zero-emission generation, and 
therefore the CES is less costly to implement. 
5.2. Personal Transportation Policies 
This section compares two personal transportation sector policies: a corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standard, and a vehicle emissions standard (VES).  
These policies are intensity based standards applied to the new fleet of cars for a given 
year, the CAFE sets a standard of MJ of fuel consumed per vehicle kilometre travelled 
(vkt). The VES sets a standard of tons CO2e emitted per vehicle kilometre travelled (see 
Table 13). Every year, a car company’s new fleet of cars needs to meet these standards 
on average, meaning they can sell cars above the standard as long as they also sell 
cars below the standard. These standards are also tradable between companies, thus 
the marginal cost for complying with the standard is assumed to be equal across the 
sector. These scenarios only examine the effects of personal transportation policies in  
isolation; the electricity sector operates under business as usual conditions.  
The CAFE standard is set to correspond with final standards approved by the 
US President from 2012-2016 and standards proposed by the federal administration 
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from 2017-2025. After 2025, the CAFE standard is set on a linear course to achieve a 
tripling of fuel economy by 2050 from 2005 levels, a policy that was defined and studied 
in Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum 24.   
The modeling of the VES in CIMS assumes that all E85 vehicles sold will use 
E85 fuel. As discussed in Section 4.3, a slight cost incentive exists to fuel E85 vehicles 
with gasoline. The EPA will be addressing this issue with respect to their VES by taking 
into account national E85 fuel consumption.  The current structure of CIMS does not 
allow for these dynamics to be included in this study. The significance of not including 
these dynamics is that CIMS may overestimate the number of E85 vehicles that will be 
produced by companies to reach the VES. 
Table 13 Policies – Personal Transportation 
 
The vehicle emissions standard was set to achieve equivalent emission 
reductions in the personal transportation sector as the CAFE standard (see Table 14).  
However, since the VES results in greater ethanol production than the CAFE standard, 
economy-wide emissions for the VES are slightly higher than the CAFE in periods 2025-
2045, but reach equivalency in 2050. For comparison, an economy-wide GHG tax is 
applied that achieves equivalent emission reductions as the direct emission reductions of 
the CAFE and VES policies within the personal transportation sector.  Indirect emissions 
from electricity generation and ethanol production are not considered in the calculation 
of the target for the GHG tax.  
CAFE 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 24 26 27 28 28
Policy 24 36 51 62 73
VES 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 376 327 309 301 301
Policy 376 243 115 69 43
GHG Tax - Match Trans 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU 0 0 0 0 0
Policy 0 9 57 57 57
(miles/gallon)
(g CO2 / mile)
($US2010 / 
tonne CO2e)
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Table 14 Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Transportation Policies 
 
The CIMS personal transportation sector includes all standard modes of personal 
transportation within cities and between cities. In addition to vehicles, the sector also 
includes transportation by foot, bicycle, bus, rail, and air.  As the CAFE and VES 
standards become more stringent in later periods, the emissions from vehicles are near 
zero and the remaining emissions in this sector are from travel by bus, rail and air. 
 By 2050, both the CAFE and the VES reduce GHG emissions in the personal 
transportation sector by 1,450 Mt CO2e from their projected levels under the BAU 
scenario.  However, under both policy scenarios, about 65% of these emission 
reductions are negated by increased emissions from energy supply sectors, thus the net 
reduction in economy-wide GHG emissions is only 500 Mt CO2e from BAU levels in 
2050. By comparison, the Copenhagen target aims to be 6800 Mt CO2e below BAU 
levels in 2050 at 1100 Mt CO2e/year. 
 Under a CAFE policy, GHG emission increases are primarily in the electricity 
sector – increasing by 800 Mt CO2e from BAU levels in 2050. As well, GHG emissions in 
the natural gas extraction sector increase by 100 Mt CO2e from their BAU levels in 2050 
due to increased natural gas demand from the electricity sector. These emission 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Gt CO2e) 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU Economy-wide 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.9
Electricity 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.7
Transportation 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0
CAFE Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.6 7.4
Transportation 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Electricity 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.7 3.6
Ethanol 0.04 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
VES Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.8 7.4
Transportation 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Electricity 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.5 3.1
Ethanol 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5
Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.0 6.4
Electricity 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.8
Transportation 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.9
GHG Tax - 
Match Trans
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increases are a result of increased total generation by this sector as vehicles switch from 
being primarily fueled by gasoline to being primarily fueled by electricity. Electric vehicles 
are the most efficient vehicle option on the market today and a tripling of fuel economy 
can only be achieved with a high percentage (~70%) of electric vehicles in the fleet.    
Since CIMS was set to produce constant levels of refined petroleum products, 
the decrease in demand of gasoline under a CAFE did not result in decreased gasoline 
production. Thus under this configuration of CIMS- US, GHG emission increases in the 
electricity sector were not offset by emission reductions in the petroleum refining sector. 
In reality, GHG emissions would probably decrease in the petroleum refining sector, but 
since the status of future export markets for refined petroleum is highly uncertain, 
production was held constant to produce conservative results for emission reduction 
potential under these transportation policies. 
Under a VES policy, GHG emission increases are split evenly between electricity 
and ethanol production, with each sector increasing direct emissions by 400 Mt CO2e 
from BAU levels in 2050. As well, increased production in both of these sectors 
increased natural gas demand, resulting in 130 Mt CO2e increase in the natural gas 
extraction sector by 2050 from BAU levels. At 50% of new market share, the plug in 
ethanol vehicle is the most popular vehicle option by 2050, explaining why GHG 
emission increases occur in both the electricity and ethanol production sectors. 
The finding that a CAFE and VES policy result in similar GHG emissions at the 
economy-wide level is somewhat surprising since total energy consumption under a VES 
policy is 10,000 peta joules (PJ) higher than under the CAFE policy in 2050. The VES 
policy scenario can achieve similar overall emission levels while having substantially 
more energy consumption because the GHG emissions intensity of ethanol production is 
30% of the emissions intensity of electricity generation.  In 2050, ethanol production 
emits 0.04 tonnes CO2e per giga joule (GJ) of ethanol produced, and the electricity 
sector emits triple this amount at 0.12 tonnes CO2e per giga joule of delivered electricity. 
 In 2050, the economy-wide GHG tax policy achieves annual emission 
reductions of about 1500 Mt CO2e economy wide from the BAU scenario, which is three 
times higher than the emission reductions at the economy-wide level of the CAFE and 
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VES policies, but equivalent to the direct emission reductions within the personal 
transportation sector under the CAFE and VES.  Interestingly, hardly any of the emission 
reductions under this GHG tax come from the personal transportation sector - 65% of the 
reductions come from the electricity sector, 7% from the personal transportation sector, 
and 28% from other sectors. 
Table 15 shows the total present value cost of the second set of policies.  The 
TEC measure finds substantial cost savings under a CAFE standard, estimating a $56 
billion a year savings over the forty year simulation period.  The TEC measure finds the 
VES to be the most costly policy at $7.6 billion a year, and the GHG tax has a small cost 
at $1.2 billion a year over the forty year simulation period.    
Table 15 Total Cost – Transportation Policies 
 
 
A breakdown of techno-economic cost flows in the personal transportation 
sector for the CAFE and VES is shown in 
Total Cost of Policy (US$2010 Billions, discounted to 2012 at r = 5%)
Techno-Economic Cost  2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
CAFE -2,253 -56 -4701%
VES 303 7.6 519%
GHG Tax - Match Trans 49 1.2 0%
Perceived Private Cost  2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
CAFE 2,746 69 1211%
VES 1,604 40 666%
GHG Tax - Match Trans 209 5 0%
Expected Resource Cost  2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
CAFE 1,497 37 784%
VES 1,279 32 655%
GHG Tax - Match Trans 169 4 0%
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Table 16.  Under both of these policies, the personal transportation sector 
experiences TEC savings from reduced overall capital and fuel costs, but the savings 
under the CAFE standard are more than double the savings under a VES for all periods.  
While savings in fuel costs were expected since higher efficiency cars are gaining 
market share, savings in capital costs was not expected since higher efficiency/lower 
emitting motors are more expensive. As  
Table 16 shows, capital cost savings can be explained by a shift to smaller 
vehicles in both policy scenarios. Smaller vehicles are less expensive and have better 
fuel economy. Even though the motors of the cars are more costly under both scenarios, 
CIMS finds that the savings from shifting to smaller vehicles exceeds the additional costs 
of the motors.  
 
Table 16 TEC Breakdown – CAFE and VES 
  
 
Techno-Economic Cost Flows in Personal Transportation Sector for 5-Year Period
$US2010 Billions, discounted to 2012 at r = 5%
CAFE 2020 2030 2040 2050 VES 2020 2030 2040 2050
Net TEC -266 -523 -446 -355 Net TEC -126 -191 -170 -131
Δ Capital Cost -135 -135 -72 -46 Δ Capital Cost -69 -50 -30 -15
ΔVehicle Shell -133 -156 -116 -90 ΔVehicle Shell -66 -69 -50 -34
ΔMotor -2 21 44 44 ΔMotor -3 19 20 19
Δ O&M Cost 7 13 11 8 Δ O&M Cost 4 7 6 4
Δ Energy Cost -138 -402 -385 -317 Δ Energy Cost -62 -148 -146 -120
   70 
Figure 5 Total Cost – Transportation Policies 
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The PPC is nearly a mirror image of the TEC.  Whereas the TEC finds the CAFE 
standard has the greatest cost savings, the PPC finds the CAFE to be the most costly, at 
$69 billion a year on average over the forty year simulation period.  Figure 5a shows the 
greatest difference between these two measures occurs in periods 2025 and 2030, with 
approximately $700 billion separating the two for each period. According to the PPC 
method, the VES is considerably less costly at $40 billion a year, and the economy-wide 
GHG tax achieves equivalent emission reductions at a cost of $5 billion a year – just 
under 10% of the cost of the CAFE.  
The difference between the TEC and PPC measures can be seen clearly in 
Figure 5. A noticeable pattern in Figure 5’s graphs is that while the distance between the 
TEC and PPC measure is quite large under a CAFE scenario, the distance is almost 
negligible under a GHG tax.  As well, a gap exists in the VES scenario, but it is much 
smaller than the gap in the CAFE scenario. This pattern indicates why energy efficiency 
policies, like the CAFE, are vulnerable to a greater level of controversy in estimating cost 
impacts than policies targeting emissions.  Depending on one’s definition of “cost” the 
CAFE can appear to generate substantial financial savings or generate substantial 
welfare losses. 
 The wide difference between the TEC and PPC estimates can be explained by 
high intangible costs for technologies in this sector.  The dominance of the gasoline 
engine and gasoline fueling infrastructure means that alternative fuel technologies have 
substantial intangible costs.  Consumers buying vehicles also tend to have higher 
discount rates than utilities when deciding on capital investments. CIMS sets the 
discount rate for utilities at 12.5% and vehicle buyers at 25%.  Higher discount rates put 
more weight on the upfront capital costs of an investment, thus penalizing high efficiency 
cars with higher capital costs. 
Since the TEC and PPC measures have such opposing findings for the CAFE, 
the ranking of the CAFE and VES according to the ERC is quite sensitive to one’s 
assumption on the magnitude of false perceived costs.  This study assumes that 25% of 
the difference between the PPC and the TEC are false perceived costs. By this 
assumption, the expected resource cost measure finds the CAFE is 15% more costly 
than the VES at a present value of $37 billion and $32 billion a year on average, 
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respectively, over the forty year simulation period. If the magnitude of false perceived 
costs is increased to 30%, the cost of the CAFE and VES is virtually identical, and at 
35%, the CAFE is 13% less costly than the VES.  
By the standard ERC measure, the CAFE and VES are about 8 times as costly 
as the GHG tax, which highlights the question – why is the US government focusing so 
much on the transportation sector to deliver GHG emissions reductions? To economists’ 
chagrin, the answer is that cost-effectiveness seems to be taking a back seat to other 
political priorities and legal requirements.  Vehicle efficiency regulations have existed 
since the 1970s due to concern over sudden oil supply crunches. Oil security is still a 
major concern of both the Republican and Democratic parties, thus increasing vehicle 
efficiency to increase oil security is arguably the easiest policy to implement in political 
terms. The fact that a CAFE standard generates substantial techno-economic cost 
savings also gives politicians an additional justification for this policy. 
5.3. Combined Electricity and Transportation Policies 
Currently in the United States, electricity and personal transportation sector 
policies to reduce GHG emissions are being pursued simultaneously. Due to the 
interdependent relationship of the electricity and personal transportation sectors, the 
economic and environmental impacts of policies in these two sectors are different when 
they are considered together as opposed to if they are each considered separately.  To 
estimate these differences, three policy combinations were run in CIMS-US:  (1) a clean 
electricity standard (CES) and a CAFE standard, (2) a CES and a vehicle emissions 
standard (VES), and (3) a CES, VES, and an ethanol production emissions intensity 
standard (EES).  The latter policy was added because equating GHG emissions at the 
economy-wide level of the CES&CAFE and CES&VES was not possible.  With a CES, 
the GHG emissions intensity of electricity is lower than ethanol. Since a VES results in 
more electricity and ethanol consumption than the CAFE standard, the overall emission 
reductions under a CES&VES policy are less than under a CES&CAFE policy.  To 
equate emissions at the economy-wide level, I had to add another policy scenario that 
combines a CES, VES, and an ethanol emissions standard (EES).  Lastly, a carbon tax 
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policy is found that results in equivalent GHG emission reductions as the CES&CAFE 
and the CES&VES&EES. 
The stringency of each policy is shown in Table 17. The CES is set to the same 
level as in the first set of policies, achieving ~60% clean generation by 2040 and ~80% 
by 2050.  Although the percentage of clean electricity is the same, total generation is 
higher with the combined electricity and transportation policy scenarios on account of the 
increased electricity demand from the CAFE and VES respectively.  The CAFE standard 
is set to equal the stand-alone CAFE standard in the second set of policies, increasing 
fuel economy by 3 times 2005/2010 levels by 2050. The VES standard is the same as 
the VES in the second set of policies, achieving an 89% decrease in emissions intensity 
of driving from 376 gCO2/mile to 43 gCO2/mile.  The VES is set to match the emission 
reductions in the personal transportation sector achieved by the CAFE. The ethanol 
emissions standard (EES) reduces the GHG intensity of ethanol production from 0.05 to 
0.01 tonnes CO2e/GJ ethanol produced in 2050. Without a policy, ethanol production 
emissions are 0.04 tonnes CO2e/GJ ethanol in 2050.   
Table 17 Policies – Combined Electricity and Transportation 
 
CES&CAFE 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CES (% Clean Electricity) 29% 28% 27% 60% 82%
CAFE (miles/gallon) 24 36 51 62 72
CES&VES 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CES (% Clean Electricity) 29% 28% 27% 57% 80%
VES (g CO2 / mile) 376 243 115 75 50
CES&VES&EES 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CES (% Clean Electricity) 29% 28% 27% 59% 81%
VES (g CO2 / mile) 376 243 117 75 50
EES 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
GHG Tax - Match Elec & Trans 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Tax ($US2010 / tonne CO2e) 0 17 69 233 233
(tonnes CO2 /                      
GJ ethanol produced)
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The economy-wide and sector-level GHG emissions of each policy scenario are 
shown in Table 18, demonstrating that the GHG emissions of the CES&CAFE, 
CES&VES&EES, and economy-wide GHG tax scenarios are all equal. Note that without 
the ethanol emissions standard, the GHG emissions of a combined CES & VES policy 
are 500 Mt CO2e higher in 2050, which is largely a result of increasing emissions in the 
ethanol production sector caused by increased demand of ethanol from the VES.  The 
CAFE scenario does not experience increased emissions in the ethanol sector 
compared to the business as usual scenario. 
While these policies achieve substantial emission reductions compared to the 
BAU scenario, CIMS-US finds they are far from achieving the US’s Copenhagen 
commitments of 42% below 2005 levels in 2030, and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050. As 
shown in Figure 6, the CES&CAFE and the CES, VES & EES achieve emission 
reductions of about 8% below 2005 levels by 2030, and 35% below 2005 levels by 2050. 
Table 18 Annual GHG Emissions – Combined Electricity and Transportation 
Policies 
   
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Gt CO2e) 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
BAU Economy-wide 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.9
Electricity 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.7
Transportation 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0
Ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
CES & CAFE Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.0 4.9 4.3
Transportation 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Electricity 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.2 0.6
Ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
CES & VES Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.2 5.3 4.8
Transportation 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Electricity 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.2 0.6
Ethanol 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5
CES & VES Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.1 5.0 4.3
&EES Transportation 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Electricity 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.6
Ethanol 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
GHG Tax Economy-wide 6.4 6.4 6.0 4.9 4.2
Match Elec & Trans Electricity 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.1 0.8
Transportation 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4
Ethanol 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
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Figure 6 Emission Reductions Compared to Copenhagen Target 
 
Once again, the techno-economic cost (TEC) measure and the perceived private 
cost measure (PPC) are vastly different for these policy scenarios (see Table 19). The 
TEC measure finds the CES&CAFE policy saves $1.7 trillion over forty years or $44 
billion a year on average (present value).  Similar to the stand-alone CAFE scenario, 
these TEC savings are mostly explained by a switch to smaller vehicles under a CAFE 
standard and fuel savings from higher efficiency vehicles.  The techno-economic savings 
of the CES&CAFE are lower than under the stand-alone CAFE scenario due to the 
additional techno-economic costs of the CES.  
 While the TEC measure finds cost savings from a CES&CAFE policy, the 
perceived private cost measure finds this policy has a PV cost of about $3.6 trillion over 
the forty year period, 2011-2050, or $90 billion a year on average.  Since the difference 
between TEC and PPC consists of perceived intangible costs, the intangible costs 
associated with a CES & CAFE policy amount to nearly $5.4 trillion over forty years, or 
about $134 billion a year on average. 
The TEC and PPC measure for the CES, VES, & EES scenario are also quite 
different. While the TEC for this policy is $17 billion a year on average, the PPC is $63 
billion a year on average. Thus the intangible costs associated with this policy are $1.8 
trillion over forty years, or $46 billion a year on average. 
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Table 19 Total Cost – Combined Electricity and Transportation Policies 
  
Despite the differences in cost between the TEC and PPC measures, the 
expected resource cost of the combined electricity and transportation scenarios is fairly 
comparable at $2.3 and $2.1 trillion over forty years, or ~$50 billion a year on average.  
Given that the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 was $14.5 trillion, the ERC 
measure estimates the average annual cost of these policies at 0.4% of annual US GDP. 
Total Cost of Policy (US$2010 Billions, discounted to 2012 at r = 5%)
Techno-Economic Cost 2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
CES&CAFE -1,753 -44 -442%
CES&VES 727 18 42%
CES&VES&EES 693 17 35%
GHG Tax 513 13 0%
Match Elec and Trans
Perceived Private Cost 2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
Total - CES & CAFE 3,615 90 546%
CES (with CAFE) 844 21
CAFE (with CES) 2,771 69
Total - CES & VES 2,300 58 311%
CES (with VES) 699 17
VES (with CES) 1,601 40
Total - CES & VES & EES 2,526 63 352%
CES (with VES & EES) 766 19
VES (with CES & EES) 1,591 40
EES (with CES & VES) 169 4
GHG Tax 559 14 0%
Match Elec and Trans
Expected Resource Cost 2011-2050 Annual Average % Difference from Tax
CES & CAFE 2,273 57 315%
CES & VES 1,907 48 248%
CES & VES & EES 2,068 52 278%
GHG Tax 548 14 0%
Match Elec and Trans
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 In comparison, an economy-wide GHG tax would achieve equivalent emission 
reductions at about $550 billion over forty years according to the ERC measure. Thus 
the GHG tax achieves emission reductions of 35% below 2005 levels by 2050 at a 
quarter of the cost of the combined CES and transportation policy scenarios.  
 Figure 7 shows the cost dynamics for these policy scenarios over the forty year 
simulation period.  Generally speaking, these diagrams show that costs for all policies 
and by all measures stay relatively low from 2011-2020, and then starting in 2021, costs 
increase steadily. For most policies and measures, costs then start to level off after 
2040, even though the stringency of the policies increases during these periods. This 
pattern of a cost “plateau” is caused in part by the declining capital and intangible cost 
functions within CIMS. These policies encourage the consumption of higher 
efficiency/lower emission technologies, increasing learning by doing, infrastructure and 
performance information associated with these new technologies, and thus decreasing 
their capital and intangible costs.  This pattern demonstrates how investments made in 
meeting a standard in the short-term reduce costs for meeting more stringent standards 
in the long term. Such a pattern has also been empirically observed in the 
implementation of the US regulations on sulphur dioxide emissions (Taylor et al., 2005), 
and Grubb (1997) provides a good theoretical discussion on the relationship between 
abatement costs and the timing of climate change policies.   
Another reason for the “plateau” is discounting. Undiscounted costs are 
increasing in every period, however, while the undiscounted costs in 2021-2040 are 
increasing at a higher rate than the discount rate, the undiscounted costs from 2041-
2050 are increasing at an equal or lower rate than the discount rate.  
Since electricity generation increases with both the CAFE and VES, the cost of 
the clean electricity standard also increases when these transportation policies are 
implemented.  The PPC of the stand-alone CES is $670 billion over forty years. When a 
CAFE is added to the CES, the PPC for the CES increases to $844 billion over the same 
period. When a VES is added to the CES, the PPC for the CES increases only slightly to 
$699 billion since fuel switching under this policy is primarily shifting from gasoline to 
ethanol.  But when an ethanol emissions standard is added to a VES and CES, ethanol 
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becomes more expensive and fuel switching is split between ethanol and electricity, 
increasing the cost of the CES to $766 billion. 
Interestingly, although a slight increase in the price of electricity occurs when a 
CES is combined with a CAFE and VES&EES, this increase does not change the PPC 
of the CAFE and VES compared to when the policies were simulated on their own. The 
difference between the PPC of the stand-alone CAFE and the CES&CAFE is ~$25 
billion over forty years, a tiny fraction of the total cost of $2.7 trillion. The PPC for the 
stand-alone VES and the CES&VES differs by only a few billion over forty years.  This 
indicates that a slight increase in electricity price has a negligible effect on the choice of 
vehicle under a CAFE and VES.  
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Figure 7 Total Cost - Combined Electricity and Transportation Policies 
   
   
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total PV 
Cost
($US2010, 
Billions)
CES&CAFE
TEC
PPC
ERC
(a)
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total PV 
Cost
($US2010, 
Billions)
CES&VES&EES
TEC
PPC
ERC
(b)
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Total PV 
Cost
($US2010, 
Billions)
GHG Tax - Match Elec and Trans
TEC
PPC
ERC
(c)
   80 
5.4. Electricity Price Changes 
All of the scenarios with electricity policies result in electricity price increases 
relative to the business as usual scenario. Figure 8 depicts these increases for select 
policies in undiscounted ¢/kWh. Recall that the cost of shadow emission charges and 
taxes is recycled back to the sector, so this cost is not included in the price of electricity. 
Electricity price increases are purely a factor of increased production costs in response 
to the policy.  
Figure 8 Change in Electricity Price 
 
CIMS-US finds the policy to phase-out conventional fossil fuel generation leads 
to electricity price decreases from 2016-2030 of about 0.03-0.08 ¢/kWh. Prohibiting 
generation from coal encourages the uptake of more natural gas in the period 2016-
2030. Since coal generation has a higher levelized cost than natural gas, replacing coal 
with natural gas generation actually saves costs in the electricity sector for this initial 
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increases compared to a clean electricity standard because it prohibits new natural gas 
generation after 2031, which has the lowest levelized cost out of all the generation 
options.  Thus forcing a switch from natural gas to any other type of generation 
technology increases costs relative to a policy that allows natural gas generation to 
continue.   
Figure 8 also shows that the GHG tax policy results in higher electricity price 
increases than the combined CES & transportation policies from 2021-2035. The GHG 
tax policy results in higher electricity prices because this policy results in higher levels of 
clean generation than the CES and transportation policies. Thus one of the reasons that 
the GHG Tax is less costly overall is because it benefits from achieving greater emission 
reductions in the electricity sector where abatement costs are lower. This comparison 
also highlights the danger of judging the total cost of a policy purely by its increase in 
electricity price. 
Change in household expenditure on electricity in 2050 relative to BAU is 
shown in Table 20.  Except for the GHG tax scenario, the financial cost of an increase in 
the electricity price is partially offset by reduced electricity consumption within the house 
(not including vehicles). For scenarios with transportation policies and the GHG tax, the 
electricity price increase is fully offset by a reduction in vehicle fuel costs as gasoline 
motors are replaced by electric motors.    
Table 20 Change in Household Expenses in 2050 from BAU, undiscounted 
 
 
Δ Electricity 
Price
ΔElectricity 
Consumption 
(not including 
vehicle)
Δ Household 
Electricity 
Expenditure 
(not including 
vehicle)
Δ Household 
Vehicle Fuel 
Costs
¢US2010/kWh kWh/month $US2010/month $US2010/month
Conv. FF Phase-Out 2.71 -91 31 0
CES 2.46 -77 29 0
CES&CAFE 2.61 -86 30 -221
CES&VES&EES 2.49 -82 29 -98
GHG Tax - Match Elec & Trans 1.92 101 26 -61
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In 2050, the highest increase in electricity price above BAU under these policies 
is 2.71 ¢/kWh under the phase-out of conventional fossil fuel generation. Electricity 
consumption per household is 1,147 kWh/month under this policy, lower than the 1,237 
kWh/month of the BAU scenario. Given the lower electricity consumption, this policy 
would result in an increase of $31 per month for the average household over what they 
would pay with no policies (in $2010US, undiscounted).  The lowest increase in 2050 is 
1.92 ¢/kWh for the GHG tax that matches the emission reductions of the combined 
electricity and transportation policies. Electricity consumption per household under this 
GHG tax is 101 kWh more than BAU in 2050 because households shift from natural gas 
to electricity under a GHG tax, but the overall increase in electricity expenditure is still 
less at $26/month. The increased expenditure on electricity under a GHG tax is the net 
effect after a GHG tax has been collected and then revenue is returned to utilities based 
on the amount of electricity they produce. 
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5.5. Putting Costs into Context  
The preceding sections showed that economy-wide GHG tax policies are the 
least costly way to reduce GHG emissions compared to sector-level and technology-
specific policies. An average person or policy-maker reading this analysis may be more 
interested in the absolute costs of these policies rather than their relative costs to each 
other.   Consideration of the absolute costs of policies could lead to the following types 
of questions:  
1. Can the US afford to implement any of these policies at this time?  
2. Do the benefits of reduced exposure to climate change and 
reduced fossil fuel consumption make up for the costs of 
implementing the policies?  
In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, economist Paul Krugman remarked 
that media coverage over the cost of GHG emissions abatement was suffering from the 
same biased reporting as climate change science, stating “the casual reader might have 
the impression that there are real doubts about whether emissions can be reduced 
without inflicting severe damage on the economy” (Krugman, 2010). The opinion of 
Americans on the economic impacts of climate change policies is hard to gauge as there 
is a surprising lack of survey data on this question. The majority of public opinion 
surveys in the US have focused on whether or not Americans believe anthropogenic 
climate change is occurring and if it is a problem worth addressing. Nevertheless, as 
Paul Krugman states, spokespeople are often heard in the media criticizing potential 
GHG regulations in terms of their impact on the economy, thus some American citizens 
are surely wondering if the U.S. can afford to reduce GHG emissions.    
A typical economist response to questions around economic impact is often to 
estimate the net percentage change in gross domestic product from the costs and 
benefits of a climate change policy, but this measure holds little meaning for the average 
person.  Randy Olson, paraphrasing Martin Palmer, states “data per se has no 
persuasive power at all. The only persuasive power it has is if it goes into a context 
where it is interpreted” (Olson, 2012).   
To give context to the affordability and benefits of these climate change policies, 
I compare the policy costs calculated in this study to the cost of achieving other societal 
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and private values. Admittedly, this approach is much more of an “art” than a “science”, 
thus it should not be thought of as a rigorous analysis. Rather, the intention is to provide 
some tangible reference points to stimulate self-reflection and dialogue on the meaning 
of a policy cost. The only modification that I did to standardize costs/values across 
examples was to bring each cost estimate into an annual cost estimate by dividing its 
total cost by the number of years the example spans. As well, all costs were converted 
into $2010US and rounded to the nearest billion dollars.  
To review the findings from this study, the combined electricity and 
transportation policies achieve GHG emission levels of 4.3 Gt CO2e/year, or a reduction 
of 35% below 2005 levels by 2050.  While these policies on their own would not achieve 
the US Copenhagen target of 1.1 Gt CO2e /year by 2050, they get the US half way to its 
target considering the BAU trajectory is 7.9 Gt CO2e/year.  The CES increases the 
proportion of zero-GHG emission electricity generation from 30% in 2015 to 80% in 
2050. The CAFE improves fuel economy by three times from 2010 to 2050, from 24 
miles per gallon (mpg) to 72 mpg.  The VES decreases the GHG emissions intensity of 
driving by 89%, from 376 gCO2e/mile to 50g CO2e/mile. The GHG tax matches the 
emission reductions of the combined electricity and personal transportation sectors by 
applying an economy-wide tax of $20/tonne CO2e in 2020, increasing to $233/tonne 
CO2e in 2050. 
As discussed in Section 4, I made conservative assumptions about future 
conditions in the version of CIMS-US used in this study.  By “conservative” I mean 
assumptions in the model were set to make emissions abatement more costly, 
representing a “pessimistic” view of the progress of higher efficiency and lower emission 
technologies. For example, I limited the amount of nuclear generation, the lowest cost 
alternative to fossil fuel generation, forcing the uptake of more expensive renewable and 
CCS generation. As well, I placed high intangible costs on alternative fueled vehicles 
and a 2¢/kWh storage cost was added to intermittent renewable generation. By 
evaluating an upper bound on costs, the costs of implementing these policies in reality 
would likely be lower than found in this study, as technological innovation or behavioural 
change would occur that is not captured within CIMS-US. However, the possibility exists 
that policy costs could be higher than estimated. Numerous assumptions are made 
within CIMS about future energy prices and resource availability, thus these policy cost 
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estimates are dependent on those assumptions. As well, there could still be “unknown, 
unknowns” in the cost of implementing these policies that are not included in CIMS. 
The first question of the “affordability” of the policies is concerned with dollars 
and cents, i.e., does the cash flow exist to incur extra costs for cleaner electricity 
generation, transportation, and overall GHG reduction, or will the U.S. “go bankrupt” 
implementing these policies? For the question of affordability, I’ll focus on the expected 
resource cost of the clean electricity standard and the GHG tax to match the emission 
reductions of the combined electricity and transportation policies, which have a present 
value cost of $17 billion and $14 billion on average per year, respectively, consisting 
mostly of increased capital costs. I leave out consideration of the transportation policies 
in discussing affordability since these policies generate large techno-economic savings. 
Perhaps examining what the U.S. spends on non-essential consumption items 
will help to put the affordability of the CES and GHG tax into context. The most obvious 
example of non-essential consumption I can think of is expenditure on cosmetic surgery, 
which in 2009 was $10 billion (Siew, 2009), just under the cost of the GHG tax.  One 
could also easily argue expenditure on gambling activities is an example of non-
essential spending. The gambling revenue from US commercial casinos in 2011 was 
$36 billion a year (Spain, 2012), over double the cost of the CES and GHG tax.  
As well, one could think about expenditure on goods that claim they will help 
people, but often are just the equivalent of “snake oil”. Many goods in the area of weight 
loss and diet control could be considered as part of the “snake oil” category. U.S. 
expenditure on weight loss and diet control goods and services in 2010 was valued at 
$61 billion (Marketdata Enterprises, 2011), quadruple the cost of the CES and GHG tax.   
Expenditure on non-essential goods can also be considered at the individual 
level. For example, the amount spent by the average American worker on going out for 
lunch was $1,270 in 2011, for a total of $181 billion (Accounting Principals, 2012), most 
of which is spent on unhealthy fast food (Workman, 2007). Under a CES, the additional 
cost of electricity for the average household is estimated to be $60/year in 2035, in 
undiscounted 2010 US dollars, less than 5% on what an average worker spends on 
going out for lunch.   
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 Another way to look at compensation for these additional monetary costs is to 
consider that these policies reduce the production and consumption of fossil fuels, and 
thus will reduce the level of damages caused by the fossil fuel industry.   “Damages” 
includes the monetary costs of damaged property or increased expenses, as well as the 
non-monetary cost of reduced quality of health and the environment.   Consideration of 
damages addresses the second question of whether the benefits of implementing the 
policies make up for their costs. 
CIMS estimates that the combined electricity and transportation policies and the 
GHG tax would reduce consumption of coal at least 65% from BAU levels in 2050. A 
study by the Harvard Medical School estimates the damages of the waste streams from 
coal, including, the monetizable impacts due to climate change (thus does not include 
the extinction of species); public health damages from NOx, SOx, PM2.5, and mercury 
emissions; fatalities of members of the public due to rail accidents during coal transport; 
the public health burden in Appalachia associated with coal mining; government 
subsidies and lost value of abandoned mine lands. This study finds the cost of coal to 
the U.S. public is between $300-$500 billion annually (Epstein et al, 2011). This cost is 
5-9 times higher than the ERC of the CES&CAFE policy and 22-37 times higher than the 
GHG tax. 
Another good comparison is the cost of potential damages associated with 
accidents from petroleum extraction and transportation. The CAFE and VES policies in 
this study reduce consumption of total refined petroleum in the US by 50% in 2050 
compared to 2005 consumption levels, or 70% from BAU levels in 2050.  If this reduced 
level of petroleum consumption corresponds to reduced levels of petroleum extraction in 
the US, then the US is at lower risk of sustaining damage from oil spills. Etkin (1999) 
estimates that the average cleanup cost for oil spills on land is $118 per gallon oil 
spilled.  Between 1987 and 1999, approximately 125 million gallons of oil were spilled on 
U.S. soil (Etkin, 2001), amounting to an average financial cost of over $1 billion a year 
for that period.  
But cleanup costs are only a portion of the full social cost of these spills. One 
indication of the social cost of a spill is the compensation payments oil companies have 
to pay to victims. The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is one recent example. 
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The liability of BP in clean up and compensation costs is estimated to be $40 billion 
(BBC, 2010). In addition, many citizens, businesses, and ecosystems have sustained 
damage that will never be compensated.   
Recall that the expected resource cost of the CAFE is estimated by CIMS as 
$37 billion a year and the VES is $32 billion a year. A reduction in damages from the 
extraction and transportation of oil could make up for part, but likely not all, of the loss in 
value from implementing the CAFE and VES. But reducing oil consumption also has 
other values, such as helping to achieve the US goal of energy independence.   
One indicator for how much the US values energy independence is the amount 
of money the U.S. government spends on subsidies to both the fossil fuel and biofuel 
industries in pursuit of this goal.  For example, conservative estimates of direct subsidies 
and tax breaks for fossil fuels are $10 billion a year (OECD, 2012). When subsidies to 
help secure importation routes for fossil fuels are considered, this estimate goes up to 
$40-69 billion a year (Koplow, 2004; Koplow, 2007). Subsidies for biofuels are also 
substantial –$24 billion in 2012 and they are set to increase in the coming years 
(Steenblik, 2007).  This indicates that the U.S. values the goal of energy independence 
at about $34-93 billion, which is more than the loss of value in implementing the CAFE 
and VES. Moreover, since either the CAFE or VES would make more progress towards 
the goal of energy independence than current subsidies to fossil fuels and biofuels, 
these subsidies could be eliminated and taxes lowered. 
Of course, all of these policies will reduce GHG emissions and mitigate 
damages from climate change.  Implementing these policies on their own however, will 
not be sufficient for avoiding dangerous levels of climate change. The combined 
electricity and transportation policies are estimated to bring GHG emissions from energy 
consumption  35% below 2005 levels by 2050. To avoid dangerous levels of climate 
change, the US needs to achieve an 80% reduction in emissions, along with all other 
developed countries, and developing countries also need to decrease their emissions.  
Since more policies will be needed to achieve this goal, the costs of the policies modeled 
in this study can not be compared directly to estimated damages in a traditional cost-
benefit sense.  However, I will provide a few estimates of damages to give a sense of 
potential losses if no policies are implemented. 
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One risk of increasing global average temperatures is the increased occurrence 
and severity of some natural disasters, such as hurricanes, to which the US is 
particularly vulnerable. Indeed, there has been an increase in the frequency of storms 
over the 1851-2005 period, particularly since 1980, and the increase in hurricane 
frequency is positively and significantly related to sea-surface temperatures in the North 
Atlantic (Nordhaus, 2010). As well, Emanuel (2005) has found an increasing trend in the 
intensity of storms in the North Atlantic over the last three decades.  Increasing severity 
of storms could explain why Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was (in inflation-corrected prices) 
the costliest hurricane in US history. The estimated damages to private and public 
infrastructure of hurricane Katrina is estimated to be $162 billion (Burton and Hicks, 
2005).  
To estimate future damages caused by hurricanes as a result of greater global 
temperatures, Nordhaus (2010) uses a damage intensity function for hurricanes for a 
scenario where atmospheric CO2e concentrations double by 2100.  Nordhaus finds that 
average annual hurricane damages will increase by $10 billion, or 0.08% of GDP at the 
2005 level, due to the hurricane intensification effect of a CO2-equivalent doubling. 
Another consequence of rising carbon emissions is the loss of coral reefs, which 
are harmed by both rising sea temperatures and increased ocean acidity. A recent study 
commissioned by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that 
the U.S. public values Hawaii’s coral reef ecosystem at $34 billion a year. In this study, 
total economic value includes the willingness to pay to protect the coral reef ecosystem 
for future generations, as well as direct use values, such as snorkeling over a coral reef 
or consuming fish supported by coral reef ecosystems (NOAA, 2011).   
Increased severity of hurricanes and the loss of coral reefs are just some of the 
phenomena that would impose damages with rising global average temperatures.  
Additional areas of damage for the United States include rising sea levels, changes in 
agricultural productivity, human health impacts, property damages from increased flood 
risk, and changes in the value of ecosystem services.  As well, especially at lower levels 
of temperature increase, the potential exists for temperature increases to result in some 
benefits to the US, for example from reduced need for space heating and increased 
levels of agricultural productivity. The main method of estimating the net level of damage 
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or benefit caused by a temperature increase is through using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. 
Jorgenson (2004) applies a CGE model to assess the potential levels of 
damage to the United States.  While this paper is not trying to provide a full cost-benefit 
analysis, it may nevertheless be useful to keep in mind Jorgenson’s conclusion when 
interpreting policy costs:  
In sum, the disparity in results between optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios – and the likelihood that a consideration of non-market 
impacts would tend to exacerbate this disparity – highlights the 
continuing uncertainty associated with quantifying climate change 
impacts. The fact that the economic losses associated with 
pessimistic scenarios are both larger and more continuous than the 
transient benefits gained under optimistic scenarios would seem, by 
itself, to provide some support for cautionary action on climate 
change. 
Jorgenson’s conclusion along with the earlier discussion around the affordability 
and benefits of cleaner generation and transportation are a starting point for putting 
these policy costs into context, and sparking discussion, reflection and further analysis. 
While I am not suggesting that this approach to putting costs into context take the place 
of more complete, objective and rigorous analyses, I am suggesting that this method is 
more conducive to forwarding understanding of an issue at a scale larger than a small 
research community.  
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Major Findings 
This study analyzes the cost-effectiveness of different climate change policy 
instruments according to three different measures of “cost”. While the different 
methodologies of measuring cost did not impact the ranking of policies for the electricity 
in terms of their cost-effectiveness, it did impact the ranking of policies in the 
transportation sector.  
When using the “top-down” methodology for costing, or the perceived private 
cost measure, I find that the cost-effectiveness of policies follows the general theory that 
the greater the opportunities for abatement, the lower the costs. In other words, for a 
given GHG emissions reduction target, costs are lower for policies that cover more 
emissions and allow for more flexibility in complying with the policy.  For the electricity 
sector policies, the clean electricity standard is less costly than the coal and natural gas 
generation phase-out because the CES provides for greater flexibility in how emission 
reductions are achieved. By focusing the policy on the end goal – lower GHG emissions 
intensity of generation – the CES can achieve the same emission reductions without the 
costly requirement of demanding zero market share of coal and natural gas plants. 
Likewise, the comparison of transportation policies finds that the corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standard is just about double the perceived private cost of 
the vehicle emissions standard (VES).  The VES achieves cost savings relative to the 
CAFE standard because the VES can reduce emissions by switching from gasoline to 
ethanol and by improving vehicle energy efficiency.  The CAFE standard can only 
reduce emissions through improving vehicle energy efficiency.  The high perceived cost 
of the CAFE standard represents the fact that a portion of consumers currently value 
large vehicles and the longer range of gasoline and ethanol motors.  Thus consumers 
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experience less perceived cost if a policy allows for emission reductions through fuel 
switching as well as energy efficiency.   
However, a portion of the perceived costs of the CAFE standard could also 
result from false perceived costs due to market failures. When using a “bottom-up” 
methodology for costing, or the techno-economic cost, the CAFE standard is found to be 
the least costly, generating savings of about one trillion dollars over 40 years.  While the 
perceived private cost measure finds the CAFE standard to be the most costly policy, 
producing one trillion dollars in losses. This distance between the TEC and the PPC 
means that intangible costs represent 2 trillion dollars of cost, thus the magnitude of 
false perceived costs is likely quite large.  
The rule-of-thumb of my research group is that 25% of the difference in cost 
between the TEC and the PPC are false perceived costs due to market failures.  A better 
approximation of the true welfare losses of a policy then are to subtract this 25% from 
the PPC to get a measure that we call the expected resource cost.  Going by this 
general rule, the expected resource cost of the CAFE is slightly more costly than the 
VES. 
Since the expected resource cost measure is currently based on the judgement 
of experienced CIMS modelers, research could be done to improve and/or document the 
empirical basis for this technique. Because of the uncertainty in the true proportion of the 
PPC that represents false perceived costs, this study can not conclusively state whether 
a CAFE or VES policy is more cost-effective.  However, these results do give reason to 
challenge the general view that a policy will automatically be lower in costs if it has 
greater abatement opportunities.  While policies with more abatement opportunities tend 
to be lower in cost, this is not necessarily the case for all policy comparisons. Consider 
that the equi-marginal principle states that minimizing the cost of reducing a given 
amount of pollution requires equating marginal abatement costs across all options and 
agents for reducing pollution (Baumol and Oates, 1988).  While emphasis is often put on 
the latter half of this statement, “across all options and agents”, not much emphasis is 
put on what it means to “equate marginal abatement costs”. Should a policy aim to 
equate perceived marginal abatement costs or should the goal be to equate marginal 
abatement welfare costs?  
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I would argue a policy should aim to do the latter, as those are the actual costs 
of a policy. The significance of such an argument is that an economy-wide GHG pricing 
policy might not be the most optimal policy, in terms of minimizing welfare loss or 
maximizing welfare gain.  An even more optimal policy would be an economy-wide GHG 
pricing policy combined with energy efficiency performance standards to correct for 
market failures.  A side-benefit of such a combination approach is that reducing market 
failures with regards to energy efficiency would lower the necessary GHG tax or permit 
price for achieving a given amount of emission reductions.   
As an aside, a similar argument has been made for combining GHG pricing with 
investments in research & development (R&D). The free market fails to provide optimal 
amounts of R&D due to the “positive spillover” effect whereby the value of R&D to 
society is greater than the private value of R&D to firms. Governments can make up for 
the less than optimal R&D investments of the private sector by investing public funds in 
R&D. Like correcting market failures in regards to energy efficiency, correcting the R&D 
market failure in regards to GHG emissions abatement would also reduce the necessary 
GHG tax or permit price for a given amount of emission reductions. 
Returning to the previous discussion, in estimating the total cost of a policy, the 
typical top-down model uses perceived marginal abatement costs. This modeling 
methodology is unlikely to conclude, or even consider, that a CAFE policy may result in 
less welfare costs than a VES, or that a CAFE should be combined with a GHG pricing 
policy to maximize welfare. Therein lays the value of a hybrid model which can consider 
the cost of policy from three perspectives – the bottom-up techno-economic cost, the 
perceived private cost, and the expected resource or welfare cost.  Each perspective 
provides a challenge to the other perspectives, forcing better reflection on the results of 
the model. 
While this study suggests potential benefits of pursuing energy efficiency 
policies alongside GHG pricing policies, the study finds some drawbacks of pursuing 
energy efficiency policies on their own. Although the CAFE standard achieved 
substantial emission reductions in the transportation sector, about a third of those 
emission reductions were negated by greater emissions in the electricity sector. Or from 
a different perspective, by 2050, CIMS estimates that a CAFE standard will lower 
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emissions from 21% above 2005 emissions in the BAU scenario to 13% above 2005 
emissions. Whereas a CAFE combined with a clean electricity standard will lower 2050 
GHG emissions to 34% below 2005 levels. 
Similarly, a switch from gasoline to ethanol under a vehicle emissions standard 
increases the emissions of the ethanol production sector so much that a policy scenario 
combining a VES and CES policy can not equal the emission reductions of a CAFE and 
CES policy combination.  These two examples represent a general tenet for pursuing 
sectoral regulations – when regulating an energy demand sector, consider the 
implications to the energy supply sector.  
This tenet also holds for the reverse.  The implications of regulating an energy 
supply sector need to be considered for energy demand sectors.  Comparing the two 
electricity policies demonstrates this finding.  The more costly technology regulation 
increases electricity prices more than the clean electricity standard, resulting in greater 
switching from electricity to natural gas compared to the CES.  Thus the technology 
regulation results in greater emissions in the energy demand sectors than the CES. The 
technology regulation also produces higher emissions in the primary energy supply 
sectors because more coal and natural gas are extracted to supply plants with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS).  While the CES penalizes CCS for the 10% of its emissions 
that are not captured, the technology regulations do not, resulting in greater CCS under 
the technology regulation than the CES. 
 In summary, this study finds substantial potential savings for implementing 
tradable performance standards over technology regulations. As well, this study 
estimates that an economy-wide GHG pricing policy is a quarter of the cost of relying on 
tradable performance standards in the electricity and transportation sector. We know 
GHG pricing is central to achieving deep emission reductions at a low cost, thus it seems 
this should eventually happen. But potentially the United States needs some “stepping 
stones” before making the big leap of economy-wide GHG pricing.  Tradable 
performance standards show promise in providing this bridge. With the right design, 
tradable performance standards could eventually be traded between sectors, 
constructing a GHG pricing system from the “bottom-up”.     
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6.2. Recommendations for Future Studies 
This study shows that the flexible hybrid structure of CIMS enables comparative 
analysis of policies at all levels (technology, sector, economy-wide) and from different 
perspectives of policy cost. Since the U.S. is currently focusing on technology and 
sector-level regulations, this modeling structure may become even more valuable. To 
improve policy costing analysis with CIMS, I would suggest two studies – the first one to 
focus on providing a more empirical basis for the expected resource cost method, and 
the second one to compare abatement costs of CIMS with top-down models.  
This first study on the ERC method would focus on finding an empirical basis for 
the percentage of cost between the TEC and PPC that is likely due to false costs from 
market failures.  This study used a rule-of-thumb of 25%.  The real percentage could 
vary between sectors and perhaps even vary depending on the technology. I used the 
25% number in this study because I thought it would be sufficient for a cost-effectiveness 
study, but the similar ERC values of the CAFE and VES meant this choice of 25% has a 
large influence on which of these policies is determined to be less costly.  Along with 
improving analysis of cost-effectiveness, a stronger empirical basis for the ERC would 
give more confidence to estimates of the absolute welfare loss/gain of a policy. 
Despite the desirability of having a greater empirical basis for the ERC, future 
research in this area could run into challenges in developing a method to determine the 
percentage of false perceived costs.  While Moxnes (2004) demonstrates the presence 
of false perceived costs, a method for translating the findings from a study like Moxnes 
(2004) into an estimate for ERC is not self-evident. Consequently, a student who is 
familiar with discrete choice methods using stated and revealed preference data would 
likely have more success at developing such a method. Another starting point could be 
to search for research on the factors that contribute to high revealed discount rates and 
the contribution of market failures to these discount rates.  However, this research may 
not exist. Jaffe and Stavins (1994) developed a theoretical model on the adoption of 
energy efficiency investments whereby they concluded that it is impossible to 
disentangle the factors contributing to high discount rates from observed purchase 
decisions, but potentially other methods exist. Given these potential challenges, I think it 
would be useful for someone to first consider the value of the ERC measure compared 
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to other economic measures that CIMS can produce on its own or when it is soft-linked 
to a top-down model. 
A comparative study of CIMS with top-down models could also improve 
confidence in estimates of the absolute welfare loss/gain of a policy.  CIMS participation 
in Energy Modeling Forum 24 demonstrated that CIMS requires some of the highest 
charges on GHG emissions out of all the participant models, which were mostly top-
down models.  This finding is contrary to the view that a hybrid model such as CIMS 
should have abatement cots in between conventional bottom-up and top-down models.  
Thus other factors besides technological explicitness, behavioural realism and macro-
economic feedbacks could be influencing CIMS’ estimation of abatement costs.  A 
comparative study could attempt to find if CIMS is overestimating abatement costs or 
CGE models are underestimating abatement costs. 
One way to compare abatement costs of CIMS to CGE models is to compare 
the implicit values of elasticity of substitution in CIMS as found in Bataille (2005) and 
Baylin-Stern (2012) to values used in CGE models.  For example, if the capital-fuel 
elasticities are found to be lower in CIMS compared to CGE models, energy efficiency 
investments will be more costly in CIMS. As well, if the inter-fuel elasticities are lower in 
CIMS than most CGE models, this may indicate that CIMS does not represent as many 
options as CGE models for switching from fossil fuels to zero-emission fuels, which 
could either mean that CGE models are overestimating abatement options or CIMS is 
underestimating abatement options. Another reason abatement costs could be higher in 
CIMS compared to CGE models is that the sectoral structure of CIMS could be more 
rigid than a CGE model, inhibiting structural change in response to a policy.   
While potential exists to improve confidence in CIMS’ estimation of welfare 
loss/gain, CIMS is limited in its ability to estimate GDP and employment effects because 
of its partial-equilibrium structure. Especially in the U.S., political debate around most 
policies, including climate change policy, centers around the impact on jobs.  Developing 
a method to estimate employment effects with CIMS-US results could enable 
participation in this dialogue. One method that was used with CIMS-Canada was to soft-
link CIMS with a CGE model. CIMS simulates the policy and then CIMS results are fed 
   96 
into the top-down model to produce macro-economic impacts such as GDP and job 
loss/gain.  
Future research that uses shadow emissions charges to phase-out technologies 
should consider that when phasing out technologies in CIMS using this method, large 
increases in the emissions charge are required to reduce the new market share of a 
technology from 2% to 0%. The steep slope of this marginal emissions charge is a result 
of the heterogeneity parameter in the CIMS market share algorithm, which gives a 
technology new market share even though its life cycle costs are higher than the 
alternatives.  A technology needs to be considerably higher than the alternatives for it to 
receive no new market share.  
Using shadow emissions charges to phase-out technologies in CIMS is 
beneficial because it allows for the calculation of the perceived private cost and the 
expected resource cost, but future research should consider if these large increases in 
emissions charges are justified. On one side, the heterogeneity parameter legitimately 
represents the fact that completely prohibiting a technology from use can be more costly 
because particular situations exist where that technology might be clearly superior to the 
alternatives.  On the other side, substantially increasing the shadow emissions charge to 
reduce the new market share of a technology from 1% to 0% may over estimate the cost 
of a technology regulation, especially for an energy service where technologies are fairly 
interchangeable. Each technology regulation may have to be evaluated according to its 
particular situation, however, some standard “rules of thumb” may be useful when 
applying this method. An example of a rule of thumb could be that once a technology 
reaches 1% new market share, if this technology requires an increase in the shadow 
emission charge of more than $100/tonne CO2e to further reduce its new market share 
to 0%, then no further increases in emissions charge are necessary and the technology 
should just be completely phased out in the next period using the market share limit 
parameters. This rule of thumb might not be the right one for each situation, it’s just an 
example of the type of rules future research may want to apply when modeling 
technology phase-outs in CIMS. 
In addition to further research on policy costing methods with CIMS, further 
studies could be done on applying technology- and sector-specific regulations to other 
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sectors. Due to the increasing marginal cost of emissions abatement, achieving the 2050 
Copenhagen target with all technology and/or sector-specific regulations could show a 
much larger price difference between these types of regulations and an economy-wide 
pricing mechanism than was found in this study. As well, tradable performance 
standards may be more difficult to implement or limited in their application for some 
sectors, such as the residential and commercial sectors. Thus some interesting work 
could be done to design the most cost-effective technology- or sector-specific 
regulations in these sectors.  
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Appendix 1  
 
Discount Rates in CIMS-US 
Sector Technology Discount Rate 
Residential Space heat/shell 
Appliances 
25% 
25% 
Commercial Building HVACs 
Appliances & Hot Water 
40% 
40% 
Transportation Private Vehicle 
Urban Public Transit 
25% 
25% 
Industrial Process 
Auxiliary 
35% 
50% 
Electricity Generation 12.5% 
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Appendix 2  
 
Example Calculation of PPC 
The Clean Electricity Standard in this study’s US2 scenario required a shadow emission 
price path as shown in chart directly below. Using this price path, the subsequent steps 
were followed to calculate PPC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
CES Price Path ($/tonne CO2e) 17 33 37 166 332 382 498
Step 1: Run shadow emission charges on GHG emissions in Electricity Sector as shown in chart below
GHG Shadow Emission Charge ($/tonne CO2e)
Simulation # 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
2 17 33 33 33 33 33 33
3 17 33 37 37 37 37 37
4 17 33 37 166 166 166 166
5 17 33 37 166 332 332 332
6 17 33 37 166 332 382 382
7 17 33 37 166 332 382 498
Step 2: Obtain Annual Economy-wide GHG Emission Reductions from Simulations in Step #1
Economy-wide GHG Emission Reductions (Mt CO2e)
Simulation # Emission Charge 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 17 32 57 90 145 223 293 373
2 33 32 125 211 324 464 582 719
3 37 32 125 226 360 518 727 801
4 166 32 125 226 750 1234 1602 1931
5 332 32 125 226 750 1401 1869 2276
6 382 32 125 226 750 1401 1885 2307
7 498 32 125 226 750 1401 1885 2334
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Step 3: Calculate PPC in each period for each marginal emission charge increase following this equation:
PPC = (Area under the curve of time period) x 3.79
3.79 adds the annual costs and discounts them to first year of the period at a 10% discount rate.
Simulation # Emission Charge 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
1 20 1,001 1,784 2,823 4,551 7,014 9,223 11,737
2 40 6,434 11,463 16,972 22,742 27,299 32,701
3 45 1,965 4,728 7,257 19,282 10,936
4 200 150,257 276,051 337,360 435,508
5 400 157,609 251,853 325,764
6 460 22,062 41,943
7 600 44,150
Step 4: Add Columns
1,001 8,219 16,251 176,508 470,673 667,079 902,739
684 3,485 4,279 28,860 47,785 42,052 35,335
Total PPC for Period, 
Millions $, discounted to 
first year in period
Total PPC for Period, 
Millions $, discounted to 
2012
